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This dissertation consists of six thematically related articles that from different 
perspectives examine the ways in which transnational families, their 
relationships, and their practices of family formation are recognised and 
regulated in law. The dissertation traverses three fields of law: family law, 
private international law and migration law.  
The dissertation investigates how transnational family relationships come 
to assume legal character, how and for what purposes ‘legality’ is invoked and 
what meanings it bears. It analyses the ways in which the recognition of 
transnational family relationships generate belonging or non-belonging and 
how these belongings are constructed in legal practice and argumentation.  
The methodological approach adopted is described as “multi-sited”. The 
study examines the research subject at four different sites: Muslim marriage 
practices in Finland; religion, culture and the concept of gender equality 
within the framework of The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the UN General 
Assembly; legislation in the Nordic countries on family reunification; and 
selected court cases on family reunification from the Supreme instances in 
Finland and Sweden, and the European Court of Human Rights and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union. At each site, research material differs and 
consequently different methodologies are applied, but the overall theoretical 
framework of the dissertation is socio-legal, and feminist intersectionality in 
particular is used as an analytical approach. 
Article I, ‘Between “official” and “unofficial”: Discourses and practices of 
Muslim marriages in Finland,’ draws on qualitative data from interviews with 
imams and other staff in eight Helsinki-based mosques, individuals, and 
bureaucrats; and cases collected from four local register offices and three 
district courts. It traces the ‘legality’ of Muslim marriages in mosques, 
practices of selected individual Muslims, and state institutions concerned with 
the registration and validity of marriages. It applies the method of 
ethnography combined with an empirical analysis of a large body of cases 
collected through the district courts and local register offices. 
Article II, ‘CEDAW and the Riddle of Diversity: Can Culture, Traditions or 
Religion Justify Economic Inequalities Embedded in Family Laws?’, focuses 
on the issue of culture and human rights law through a discussion of the 
concept of equality underpinning the Convention on Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in the context of its Article 16, 
which addresses equality in the family, in particular the economic 
consequences of marriage, family relations and their dissolution, an issue on 
which the Committee adopted its 29th General Recommendation in 2013. The 
method and approach of the article is largely a review of existing feminist and 
family law literature, and research on the context of culture and women’s 
rights, against which the discussion about equality and legitimacy of the 
CEDAW framework is set. 
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Article III, ‘Ruling on belonging: transnational marriages in Nordic 
immigration laws,’ examines the immigration regimes concerning marriage 
migration in the Nordic countries, all of which have introduced considerable 
restrictions on family reunification in their Aliens Acts in recent years. The 
article examines the contextual background to the regulation of transnational 
families in the migration law of the Nordic countries respectively, and points 
out how the conceptions of belonging underpin these bodies of law. It 
demonstrates, furthermore, that due to the current high income requirements, 
the right to family reunification remains unachievable for a significant number 
of individuals. 
Both Article IV, ‘The “nuclear family paradigm” as a marker of rights and 
belonging in transnational families,’ and Article V, ‘The married child 
belongs to no one? Legal recognition of forced marriages and child 
marriages in the reuniting of families,’ argue that, by invoking the discourses 
of status and relationship, the tensions and intersections of different legal 
fields of private international law, family law and migration law are controlled 
and manipulated, all the while the image of unitary law is still rigidly 
maintained. Article VI, ‘Best interests of the child in family reunification - a 
citizenship test disguised?’ examines how the rights of the child become 
paradoxical when applied as part of the proportionality assessment used for 
the purposes of family reunification. The article also shows how a non-
belonging identity is actively constructed for a citizen-child in the 
argumentation of the case. 
In these three articles, in terms of describing the legal problem at the centre 
of the case, the method pursued is dogmatic. Articles V and VI each offer a 
close reading of a particular case, which enables a detailed analysis of the 
discursive identity construction which occurs as the court constructs its 
argumentation. While the method of description is doctrinal, the method of 
analysis is not purely dogmatic. 
The dissertation concludes that citizenship is a discontinuous legal artefact, 
which even in its legal dimensions is, more than a mere legal status, a dynamic 
form of social capital, a shaped and accumulated construction, determined by 
a plethora of identity factors marking the belonging of a person both in the 
family and in the national community. 
Finally, the dissertation explores whether recognition theory, as developed 
most notably by Axel Honneth, might offer grounds for rethinking the 
parameters of social justice, in particular in the context of transnational family 
life and social exclusion. The dissertation develops the notion of 
intersectionality and intersectional approaches to legal research, and 
combines them to provide a distinctively legal method for reading the cases. 
Theoretically, the dissertation contributes to the on-going debates over the 
ways in which social justice should best be conceived of by developing a 
recognition-theoretical account of belonging and social relations in law. The 
dissertation adds to the growing body of research on transnationalism studies 
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“När någon har dött, är han död i hela världen. När 
någon har gift sig, är han då gift i hela världen?”1 
 
(“When someone has died, he is dead in the whole 
world. When someone has married, is he then 
married in the whole world?” - Translation SM) 
 
The question above is presented by Lennart Pålsson in the opening lines of his 
book on limping marriages and Swedish private international law, a classic in 
this field of scholarship in the Nordic countries. By posing this question, 
Pålsson wants to highlight the fact that marriage, contrary to the corporeal 
truth of life and death, is a social institution constituted by legal norms, and, 
hence, that the existence of this institution in another legal system depends on 
the norms governing its recognition.  
An entirely other issue of recognition emerges if the death took place, say, 
in Mogadishu, and the widow (or widower) of the deceased person wanted to 
have the event registered in the Finnish population register. As Somali 
documents, such as birth or death certificates, are currently considered 
unreliable and cannot be legalised, the death cannot be registered. However, 
the widow (or widower) might in this circumstance receive ‘friendly’ advice to 
file for divorce in the local district court. This way at least one “death”, that of 
the marriage, can be verified, recognised and inserted in the population 
register.2 
The “refugee crisis”, according to a number of scholars, is a crisis of border 
and imperialism, a crisis of “global apartheid”.3 It too raises issues of 
recognition, although issues of a very different nature than those described 
above. The common response to this crisis has been to redefine the relevant 
(legal) distinctions between  
 
types of people on the move, in order to determine how to better 
distribute access to mobility. It is debated on which grounds, 
moral or economic, access to mobility should be distributed.4 
[original italics]  
 
                                                 
1 Lennart Pålsson. Haltande äktenskap och skilsmässor: Komparativa studier över 
internationationelltprivaträttsliga problem beträffande äktenskap och skillsmässor med 
territorielt begränsad giltighet. Stockholm: P. A. Nordstedt & Söners förlag, 1966, 3. 
2 The example above is based on the empirical material of this study and is mentioned in 
Article I.  
3 The term coined by Jenna Lloyd. ‘Carceral Citizenship in an Age of Global Apartheid,’ 
Occasion 8 (2015), 1-15. 
4 Imogen Tyler. ’The Marketization of Mobility: Some thoughts on Value, Movement and 
Classification,’ blog post in Cemore, http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/cemore/the-marketization-




The recent events in Europe highlight that not only the crisis at the borders, 
but the concept of border itself, brings about difficult issues of recognition. 
Might these initial and intuitive observations about recognition have 
something in common, in spite of their obvious differences and 
incommensurabilities? The present study takes the view that they do. It 
examines how the law recognises transnational families and their family 
practices, and what forms of protection it offers to the members of 
transnational families and their family life. In particular, the focus is on how 
these families are recognised as members of society and the political 
community, and how their family relations mediate belonging; what role 
belonging plays in legal argumentation and how law shapes the belonging of 
an individual to a political community. Examining these issues, the study 
traverses three fields of law: family law, private international law and 
migration law. 
 
1.1 TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES AND BELONGING IN 
LAW: BACKGROUND AND GOALS OF THE STUDY 
 
Families are important to individuals, just as they are important to 
communities. Families reproduce society symbolically, materially, socially, 
culturally and psychologically, and they have the capacity to reproduce, contest 
and reorganize definitive borders in communities. While it might be nearly 
impossible to accurately define what makes a family and what it is about the 
family or family relationships that the law should meddle in, it is clear that the 
most burning questions of justice are never far from relationships based on 
emotional bonds, needs and reciprocity. For me, the attraction of family law 
lies precisely here: in the power of family law as both a moral and legal project, 
a discourse that constructs and forms personhood and communities through 
the interrelationships it creates between the state, communities, and 
individuals – thus reshaping the material reality for individuals and families 
to, again, reconfigure and internalize as part of their symbolic worlds.  
It is a widely accepted, though not problem-free, idea that communities 
adhere to certain constitutive values, a moral essence in a sense, and that the 
regulation of families is justified because of the common, public interest in 
what kinds of socializations and exercise of power takes place in families. 
Communities seek to control families, to define families as part of their self-
determination. The super community of modern times, the nation state, is no 
exception. For example, Cott, who studied the historical development of family 
norms in the United States, argues that regulating marriage was essential for 
the process of establishing both the external and internal borders of the new 
state, as marriage norms defined who could be included or excluded as a 
citizen. Struggles over marriage norms were focal in the struggles of several 
Introduction 
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excluded groups at different periods of time: former slaves, women, Native 
Americans.5 
While the liberal defence of the family6 takes as its starting point the idea 
of functional and cultural pluralism in families, stating that there is no single 
form or moral order of the family that can contribute to a just society and social 
life, the questions of multiculturalism and family law have occupied academic 
as well as political debates since the 1990s. As Grillo notes, contemporary 
European societies are multicultural and multi-ethnic, and have indeed been 
so for quite some time, but currently there is a widespread debate about 
cultural and religious difference and its limits.7 Normatively, the significance 
of pluralism is connected to the moral claim of due recognition of identities, 
reflected in the legal guarantees of minority rights. The promise of equal 
citizenship is central to minority rights, so the struggles over the position of 
minority identities happen in the arena of equal citizenship.  
The contemporary debates relating to cultural and religious diversity are 
connected to processes of transnational, and often family-related, migration, 
but the phenomenon or debates concerning it are hardly historical novelties.8 
According to Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt, compared to earlier histories of 
transnationalism, “contemporary transnationalism corresponds to a different 
phase in the world economy and to a different set of responses and strategies 
by people in a condition of disadvantage to its dominant logic”.9 As a field of 
research, transnationalism studies emerged from the need to grasp and 
approach analytically the diverse processes of decentralization of the nation 
state, in which fields of social action divert from the area governed solely by 
the nation state.10 Family is a location where diverse social relations and 
normative frameworks intersect and intertwine and where, in the words of 
Goulbourne et al., “ordinary people lead lives that transcend the boundaries 
                                                 
5 Nancy Cott. Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2000. 
6 David Archard. Family: A Liberal Defence. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. 
7 Ralph Grillo, Muslim Families, Politics and the Law: A Legal Industry in Multicultural 
Britain. Farnham; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2015. 
8 Charsley offers several examples spanning marriage migration to and from British 
colonies, “war brides” of World War II, and Japanese “picture brides”. Maynes and Waltner 
note that during the Imperialist era, partly the incentive to establish colonies sprang from the 
need to relocate the surplus population, and often enough, to find suitable spouses for the 
unmarried. Colonial rule was justified by family metaphors, where the indigenous peoples 
were likened to children and colonial rulers to parents, and management of the relationship 
between the settlers and the indigenous people required state intervention and involvement 
in all aspects of family life. Katharine Charsley, 'Transnational Marriage,' in Katharine 
Charsley (ed.) Transnational Marriage: New Perspectives from Europe and Beyond. New 
York: Routledge, 2012, 1; Mary Jo Maynes and Ann Waltner. The Family: A World History. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012; Sarah Katherine van Walsum. The Family and the 
Nation: Dutch Family Migration Policies in the Context of Changing Family Norms. 
Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. 
9 Alejandro Portes, Luis E. Guarnizo and Patricia Landolt. ‘The study of transnationalism: 
pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field,’ Ethnic and Racial Studies 22:2 (1999), 
227. 
10 Nina Glick Schiller and Peggy Levitt, 'Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational 
Social Field Perspective on Society,' International Migration Review 38:3 (2004), 1002; 
Steven Vertovec, Transnationalism. London: Routledge, 2009. 
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of nation-state, and potentially threaten other social and cultural boundaries 
set by race, ethnicity, and so forth.”11  
In this context it is worth noting that not only the families in the focus of 
this study are transnational but also that law is increasingly transnational. 
Histories of knowledge embodied in legal norms and doctrines travel and 
become intertwined with national norms, each with their own histories. For 
example, while colonial dynamics might be of little importance in the Finnish 
context, the human rights law concerning migrants’ rights to family life is 
largely based on the racialized exclusion of colonial subjects during the 
drafting of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).12 
Furthermore, to a large extent they are developed in the case law as responses 
to the applications filed against former colonial settler states, such as the UK 
and the Netherlands. 
The three fields of law in the focus of this study, family law, private 
international law and migration law, are intertwined in a number of ways, 
although in the doctrinal logic of the legal system they are strictly separate. 
Examples of their interconnections are many, but a few can be mentioned to 
illustrate: In the case of Cojan (C—673/16), currently pending before the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), the court is called to rule whether it 
follows from the free movement rights of EU citizens that a marriage of two 
people of the same sex will have to be recognised in a state that does not 
provide for legal recognition of same sex relationships.  
Another example concerns the practical interface between child law and 
migration law: when an on-going and affective parent-child relationship is a 
condition for the renewal of the parent’s residence permit, it can de facto be 
the reason why custody or access arrangements are officially recorded in 
agreements or court orders in specific ways so that the agreement would bear 
witness to such relationship.13 In her study on divorce in transnational 
families, Sportel discovered that law enables members of transnational 
families differently and that marital power relations explain how law becomes 
mobilised.14 There is reason to believe that power relations are significant also 
in the context custody and access, especially if the residence status of the 
parent depends on the legal formulation of these rights and obligations. 
Yet another example concerns intersections of the system providing 
international protection of refugees and the system designed to prevent child 
abductions: in a recent case the Finnish Supreme Court was called to evaluate 
whether the Hague Convention on Child Abduction should be applied in a 
situation where the child had been granted asylum and refugee status. Both 
parents were guardians of the child, but the father had fled Belarus and taken 
the child with him to Finland without the mother’s permission. Both father 
                                                 
11 Harry Goulbourne, Tracey Reynolds, John Solomos, and Elisabetta Zontini. 
Transnational Families: Ethnicities, Identities and Social Capital. Abingdon: Routledge, 
2010, 11. 
12 Marie-Bénédicte Dembour. When Humans Become Migrants: Study of the European 
Courts of Human Rights with an Inter-American Counterpoint. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015. 
13 This point has fequently come up in my ongoing research, especially in the interviews 
and informal discussions with professionals in the field of legal aid and child welfare. 
14 Iris Sportel. Divorce in Transnational Families: Marriage, Migration and Family Law. 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016, 248. 
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and child were granted asylum and refugee status. The mother of the child 
requested that the child be returned to her in Belarus, which was what 
eventually happened.15 
However, while the three examples above are about intersecting legal fields 
and regimes, this study approaches the interconnections between the legal 
fields from a slightly different perspective. By looking at how trasnational 
families are regulated at different ‘sites’, it attempts to move beyond merely 
looking at law as a doctrinal practice. To view the regulation and control of 
families and the questions of social justice from the perspective of 
transnational families and transnational social and normative spheres means 
looking at local phenomena, for example religious family law, as something 
that takes place in a transnational space, where local cultures, policies and 
authorities expand beyond the remit of the nation state in complex ways. This 
means that an investigation into transnationalism and law is an investigation 
into legality and the process in which it is constructed, as well as into the legal 
borders of and within the nation state. The myriad ways in which these borders 
are erected and maintained, are also key to understanding how they can be 
contested and belongings to communities renegotiated. The goal of this study 
is to rethink grounds for contemporary solidarity – to rethink “us”, the 
political and legal community, as a community of responsibility where the 
precariousness of all lives could be recognised.   
This synthesis of the study is divided into four chapters. The present 
chapter introduces the research questions and research design, research 
materials, methods and ethical considerations, and the second chapter 
establishes the theoretical framework adopted as well as the theoretical tools 
used in the analysis. The third chapter examines, first, the three fields of law 
and their doctrinal foundations in relation to themes of the present study and 
then moves on to present the findings made in the study by examining how 
different aspects of intersectionality show at different sites of the study and 
which techniques of government it renders visible in the analyses. The fourth 
chapter concludes the synthesis with a reflection on the research questions and 
new avenues for research that the study brings. 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
1.2.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
Ever since the famous essay by Marshall, it has been clear that formal 
citizenship, and legal rights attached to citizenship status, do not rule out the 
inequalities prevailing in capitalist society, but that they are “necessary to the 
maintenance of that particular form of inequality”.16 Citizenship studies have 
broadened the notion of citizenship from the narrow understanding of 
citizenship as a formal legal status into a broader, socio-cultural definition of 
                                                 
15 KKO:2016:65, the Supreme Court of Finland, 14 October 2016. 
16 T.H. Marshall. Citizenship and Social Class and other essays. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1950, 33. 
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membership in order to include various axes of exclusion and inclusion that 
shape the substance of citizenship.17 ‘Belonging’ is constitutive of citizenship 
in the sense that it encompasses the various factors and processes that denote 
membership in a community. In this work, by ‘belonging’ I refer to, firstly, the 
material conditions such as formal status norms that define who is considered 
a member of the community, the “authorized ‘we’”,18 and secondly, the 
subjective element of identity included in that relationship.19  
The subjective element of ‘belonging’ includes identities and subjectivities 
that are institutionally accepted as entitled insiders, and often it emerges as 
authorised knowledge produced in the legal process about the individual and 
about whether their personal identity merits the benefit of belonging. 
Belonging can, thus, find expression in the level of legal norms that define the 
recognition of family relationships (e.g. recognition of relationships in private 
international law and recognition of relationships in immigration law), or the 
accessibility into legally recognised family institutions such as marriage, or in 
the legal norms that place different families in hierarchical order, for example, 
on the basis of family form or the conditions under which the family was 
formed (e.g. the distinction between new and old families in immigration law). 
Furthermore, belonging is interrogated and sometimes contested in the legal 
practice as a way of distinguishing between just and unjust, or legitimate and 
illegitimate, based on the individual merits of the case, for example, as a part 
of the proportionality analysis. 
The present study examines the recognition of transnational family 
relationships and the ways in which this recognition generates belonging or 
non-belonging by investigating the following research questions: 
 
1. In the six thematically related studies included in this research, 
                                                 
17 In particular feminist inquiries on citizenship, research on children’s citizenship, 
multicultural citizenship, intimate citizenship and global citizenship as well as the emerging 
inquiries into religious citizenship have contributed to the intersectional understanding of 
citizenship as a layered position marked by discontinuities and contradictions. See for 
example Antonella Invernezzi and Jane Williams. Children and Citizenship. Los Angeles: 
SAGE Publigations, 2008; Ruth Lister. Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Seyla Benhabib. Another Cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006; and The Rights of Others. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004; Sasha Roseneil. ’Intimate Citizenship: A Pragmatic, Yet Radical, Proposal for a Politics 
of Personal Life,’ European Journal of Women's Studies 17:1 (2010) 77-82; and Cecilie Thun,. 
’Norwegiannes as Lived Citizenship: Religious Women Doing Identity Work at the 
Intersections of Nationality, Gender and Religion,’ Nordic Journal of Religion and Society 
25:1 (2012): 1-25. 
18 Anna Bohlin, 'The Politics of Locality: Memories of District Six in Cape Town,' in Nadia 
Lovell (ed.) Locality and Belonging, 168-188. New York: Routledge, 1998, 163. 
19 In sociological literature ‘belonging’ is depicted as incorporating both the personal, 
intimate feelings of “being ‘at home’ in a place (place-belongingness) and as a discursive 
resource that constructs, claims, justifies, or resists forms of socio-spatial inclusion / exclusion 
(politics of belonging)”. Marco Antonsich. Marco. ‘Searching for Belonging – An analytical 
Frame,’ Geography Compass 4:6 (2010), 644. See also: Floya Anthias. ‘Identity and 
Belonging: conceptualisations and political framings,’ Working Paper No. 8 (2013) KLA 
Working Paper Series. Research Network for Latin America; Nira Yuval-Davis. ‘Power, 




a. how do transnational family relationships come to assume 
legal character; 
b. how and for what purposes is ‘legality’ invoked and what 
meanings does it bear? 
 
2. How does the regulation and recognition of transnational family 
relationships  
a. contribute to the production of belonging and non-belonging, 
and thus create or reproduce social postionality and axes of 
inclusion and exclusion; and 
b. how are these belongings constructed in legal practice and 
legal argumentation, especially at the intersections of 
different legal fields?  
 
3. What new avenues might a recognition theoretical framework 
open for  
a. understanding the role of law in the struggles for social 
justice, especially through the logic of distinctions made in 
legal practice concerning belonging; and 
b. immanent critique and rethinking of law in relation to social 
inclusion and exclusion? 
 
The study comprises six thematically related studies (Articles I to VI), that 
all approach the first and the second research question from slightly different 
angles. The final research question concerns the overarching theme of the 
research project, and will be addressed in this synthesis. In the following 
section, I will discuss the design of this research, which rests on the idea of 
multiple sites, in order to explain what ties these six studies together and why 
I chose these particular ‘sites’ of research, as well as discuss some of the 
consequences of the choices made (1.2.2). I will then present the research 
materials and methods used (1.3.1) and conclude the chapter with a brief 
reflection on research ethics (1.3.2).  
1.2.2 RESEARCH DESIGN: COMPOSING MULTI-SITED RESEARCH 
 
My initial plan was to study the concept of the family in a multicultural and 
religiously diverse society, from a legal dogmatic perspective of family law 
and private international law. Related to migration, Islamic family practices 
emerged in western courts as cross-border family law cases, which by and 
large meant that the discussion over religious family law happened in the 
arena of private international law. Academics have provided rich analyses 
concerning the recognition and consequences of foreign Islamic marriage,20 
                                                 
20 Mathias Rohe. ‘Islamic Law in German Courts,’ Hawwa: Journal of Women in the 
Middle East and and the Islamic World 1:1 (2003), 46-59; Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg. ’On the 
Cooperation between Religious and State Institutions in Family Matters: Nordic Experiences,’ 
in Prakash Shah, Marie-Claire Foblets and Mathias Rohe (eds.) Family, Religion and Law: 
Cultural Encounters in Europe, 79-114. Farnham and Burlington: Ashgate, 2014. 
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divorce21 and even questions of inheritance.22 However, as the study 
proceeded it became clear that the recognition and regulation of family 
happens in other legal arenas as well. In fact, for the migrating families, the 
control of family life imposed by migration law can bear just as much or even 
more significance than the civil law aspects of the recognition of marriage and 
divorce. Moreover, while the doctrinally oriented analytical legal thinking 
tends to keep these different fields of law strictly apart, initial research into 
the case law seemed to suggest that they are in many respects intertwined.  
In the spring of 2012 I came across a case from the Swedish Migration 
Court of Appeal (migrationsöverdomstolen), which is the supreme instance 
in migration issues in Sweden.23 The case, which concerned recognition of a 
child marriage and a (claimed) forced marriage in the migration context, 
invoked many questions that, while being substantially about migration law, 
also concerned the research questions I had sketched out for my project. The 
marriage was eventually considered valid (in the context and for the purposes 
of the Swedish Aliens Act) despite strong indications that the applicant, a 
child herself, had been forced into marriage. The argument of private 
international law about the recognition of the marriage emerged as an 
incidental question and effectually determined the end-result of the case. 
This case is included in this study and analysed in Article V.  
Trying to figure out why, despite all the doctrinal and analytical clarity of 
its argumentation, the case was so disturbing, I initially suspected that 
something significant yet only partially articulated was underpinning the way 
in which law seemed to work with the intersecting and overlapping general 
doctrines. This important issue was one of ‘belonging’, of being regarded 
either as an insider or an outsider. The position of belonging seemed to 
depend on multiple affiliations and subjectivities formed at the intersections 
of family law, private international law and migration law. As a result of this 
initial finding, as well as my affiliation with an interdisciplinary research 
project on transnational Muslim families,24 the focus of this study shifted 
from minority families and religious family law towards transnationalism 
and its impact on families, as well as towards questions such as how the state 
governs its population by regulating the transnational family. 
The previous research has convincingly argued that the relationship 
between family norms and social control in other fields, such as immigration 
and integration, are mutually constitutive.25 Van Walsum, for example, 
examined the history of Dutch nationality and immigration law in the period 
from 1945 to 2000 in the context of changes that took place during the same 
                                                 
21 Rubya Mehdi, Werner Menski and Jorgen Nielsen (eds.) Interpreting Divorce Laws in 
Islam. Copenhagen: DJOF Publishing, 2012; Pascale Fournier. Muslim Marriage in Western 
Courts: Lost in Transplantation. Farnham: Ashgate, 2010. 
22 Mosa Sayed. Islam och arvsrätt i det mångkulturella Sverige: En internationellt 
privaträttslig och jämförande studie. Uppsala: Iustus Förlag, 2009. 
23 Case MIG 2012:4, Kammarrätten i Stockholm, Migrationsöverdomstolen, 5 March 
2012. 
24 Academy of Finland research project entitled ‘Transnational Muslim Marriages in 
Finland: Wellbeing, Law, and Gender’. The project is led by Dr. Marja Tiilikainen at the 
Department of Social Research, University of Helsinki. 
25 Saara Pellander. Gatekeepers of the Family - Regulating Family Migration to Finland. 
(Doctoral dissertation, 2016). Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of 
Helsinki; Cott 2000; Van Walsum 2008. 
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time in Dutch family norms. She found continuities between the present 
restrictive family migration policies in the Netherlands and the earlier 
dynamic between family norms and racist modes of exclusion in the Dutch 
East Indies.26 Instead of sketching a racist conspiracy underlying the legal 
system, van Walsum drew on the idea, originally expressed by Sassen,27 that a 
shift is taking place “from a nationally oriented order of the post-war Welfare 
State to a more globally oriented neo-liberal one”, in which capabilities and 
rationalities developed within a previous order are re-constituted as part of a 
new organising logic. In the process, new “foundational realignments” are 
generated.28 
These observations led me to approach the topic of my research by looking 
at the different sites in which the recognition (and regulation) of transnational 
family life and family relationships takes place, how the ‘legality’ of 
relationships is constructed on these sites, who are the actors in the process, 
and what kind of “foundational realignments” are generated by the process. 
The term ‘site’ is used here to describe the different perspectives from which I 
approach my research questions, the different research designs of the studies, 
and the ways in which these are connected. In this descriptive use the term 
lacks any clear conceptual definition. However, adopting the idea of “multi-
sited” research design is inspired by the methodological debates in the field of 
ethnography and the notion of multi-sited ethnography.29  
Multi-sitedness, in essence, means following the thread of a process in 
which cultural meanings circulate instead of seeking to offer a holistic 
representation of the research subject.30 The matter traced does not have to be 
a people or an entity; it can exist within the realm of discourse and modes of 
thought.31 It can be, for example, a conflict or a logic of regulation or the idea 
of ‘legality’ in the context of family relationships. At the same time, however, 
it is crucial to keep in mind the fact that the paths that the researcher “follows” 
or the field of the inquiry are not “natural” but actively constructed in the 
research design as the outcome of choices made.32 The research subjects are 
“nodes in distributed knowledge systems”,33 constantly in motion and 
“ungraspable in any definitive sense”.34 Constructing the field of research 
within distributed knowledge systems also means that it can be approached 
from various positions of expertise and, consequently, practise different 
                                                 
26 Van Walsum 2000, 20. 
27 Saskia Sassen. Territory, authority and rights. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2006. 
28 Van Walsum 2008, 42. 
29 See for example: George E. Marcus. ‘Ethnography in/of the world system: The 
emergence of multi-sited ethnography,’ Annual review of anthropology (1995), 95; Simon 
Coleman and Pauline Von Hellermann (eds.) Multi-sited Ethnography: Problems and 
Possibilities in the Translocation of Research Methods. New York: Routledge, 2011. 
30 Marcus 1995, 97 and 98. 
31 Marcus 1995, 108. 
32 Simon Coleman and Pauline Von Hellerman. ‘Introduction: Queries, Collaborations, 
Calibrations,’ in Coleman, Simon, and Pauline Von Hellermann (eds). Multi-sited 
Ethnography: Problems and Possibilities in the Translocation of Research Methods, 1-15. 
New York: Routledge, 2011. 
33 Coleman and Hellerman, 2011, ‘Introduction’, 5. 
34 Coleman and Hellerman, 2011, ‘Introduction’, 7. 
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methods of analysis.35 In the following, I will briefly discuss some of the 
consequences of the methodological choices made in this study, especially with 
regard to the multi-sited approach adopted. 
This study seeks to shed light on the various interconnections between the 
fields of family law, private international law and migration law, as well as the 
recognition orders these fields embody, in order to analyse how the ways in 
which transnational families are regulated in law generate and maintain social 
hierarchies and exclusion. As explained above, the study analyses these 
processes at various sites. The downside of this way of framing the research 
project is the lack of coherence and coverage of the findings when viewed from 
the perspective of the systematic order of a particular legal field.36 For the 
purposes of this study adopting the starting point of systematic legal analysis 
would mean losing sight of the interactions and processes in which systematic 
logic takes part in reproducing hegemonies and hierarchies. However, the 
starting point that law intertwines with politics and takes an active part in 
reproducing our social order by legitimising it is not taken to mean that the 
doctrinal logic of law would be unimportant or uninteresting for the study.  
‘Transnational families’ are anything but a “natural” group or a monolithic 
group of people.37 The sites of inquiry in the study, likewise, are not “natural” 
but constructed as part of and for the purposes of the analysis. This bears 
relevance to how the transnational families at the centre of the analysis are 
constructed. The research site and the reseach subject are mutually 
constitutive; the construction of the research site constitutes which aspects of 
transnationalism are investigated and what ‘transnational family’ means in 
each context. De Hart defines her research subject, ‘mixed intimacy’, as not 
coming from  
 
pre-existing racial or ethnic differences between the partners, but 
[as something which] depends on how race and ethnicity are 
socially and legally constructed. Hence, a mixed marriage is a 
marriage between partners of two groups that are considered to 
be distinct racial or ethnic groups by society at a certain time and 
place.38  
 
                                                 
35 Marcus, George E., ‘Multi-sited Ethnography: Five or Six Things I Know About it Now,’ 
in Simon Coleman and Pauline Von Hellermann (eds). Multi-sited Ethnography: Problems 
and Possibilities in the Translocation of Research Methods, 16-32. New York: Routledge, 
2011.  
36 The six articles include case analyses of law in different national and regional contexts 
(Sweden, Finland, EU law, and European and international human rights law). The pitfalls of 
selectively including such a vast array of material from various normative sources should be 
evident. The sites of the study are have been constructed in relation to space and geographical 
locations but whilst these are taken as particular features of the site that shape the power 
relations constitutive of the state but they are not definitive of it. Each article describes the 
context as well as the level of analyses for the purposes and scope of that article. Observations 
and arguments presented in this synthesis move on a general European level, unless a 
particular local context is specifically mentioned. 
37 See the discussion in Sportel 2016, 257-258. 
38 Betty de Hart. Unlikely couples: Regulating mixed sex and marriage from the Dutch 
colonies to European Migration Law. Amsterdam: Universiteit van Amsterdam, 2015, 10. 
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In a similar vein, ‘transnational families’ are demarcated slightly differently in 
each study included in this study. For example, transnational families are not 
necessarily about culture or religious minorities, let alone Muslims and Islam. 
However, religion, in particular Islam, often intersects with transnational life 
trajectories due to the current migration patterns from Muslim countries to 
Europe. The number of Muslims living in Europe has increased rapidly; today 
Islam is the second largest religion for example in Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway.39 Migrant Muslim families are, furthermore, in several countries at 
the centre of regulative family politics.40 In the Finnish context, most Muslims 
have a migrant background which means that transnationalism, migration, 
family and Islam intersect in various ways. Furthermore, it is important to 
note that the impact of gender in transnational families is not reducible to 
women’s rights and gender ideologies reflected in debates over women’s rights 
and culture.41 Gender ideologies are, however, central in the regulation of 
relationships and intimacy and the debates over gender equality have emerged 
particularly in relation to Muslim identities and family practices and norms. 
One could also argue that ‘transnational’ as a term exists in relation to 
‘national’, which means that it only becomes visible in contrast to the 
“normative national”. One conclusion drawn on the basis of the analysis 
provided in this study is that this normatively construed ‘national’ creates 
social marginalisation and results in the generation of “other” identities in 
legal argumentation. In part, this is of course a choice; as this study is 
concerned with social marginality and prevailing inequalities, a conscious 
choice was made in designing the research to examine those instances where 
transnationality creates marginality and techniques through which this effect 
is achieved. This, however, is not to say that all transnational families were 
socially marginalised or precarious in the same way.  
1.3 RESEARCH MATERIAL, METHODOLOGY AND 
RESEARCH ETHICS 
1.3.1 DATA, MATERIALS AND RESEARCH METHODS 
 
The present thesis consists of six thematically related studies located on four 
different sites. The first of these four sites is that of ‘legality’ of Muslim 
                                                 
39 Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg. ‘The Legal Scope for Religious Identity in Family Matters – 
The Paradoxes of the Swedish Approach,’ in Jane Mair and Esin Örücü (eds.) The Place of 
Religion in Family Law: A Comparative Search, 73-96. Cambridge: Intersentia, 2011. 
40 See for example: Grillo 2015; Jessica Robyn Cadwaller and Damien W. Riggs. ‘The State 
of the Union: Toward a Biopolitics of Marriage’ M/C Journal, 15:6 (2012); Annelies Moors 
and Vanessa Vroom-Najem. ‘Converts, Marriage and the Dutch Nation-State: Contestations 
about Muslim Women's Wellbeing,’ in Marja Tiilikainen, Mulki Al-Sharmani and Sanna 
Mustasaari (eds.) Wellbeing of Transnational Muslim Families: Marriage, Law and Gender. 
Routledge, forthcoming.  
41 Betty de Hart, Nadia Sonneveld and Iris Sportel. ‘New Perspectives on Gender in Shari’a-




marriages in Finland. This research site, in fact, consists of various sites at 
which the ‘legality’ of Muslim marriages is constructed and may be contested. 
Article I traces the ‘legality’ of Muslim marriages in mosques, practices of 
selected individual Muslims, and state institutions concerned with the 
registration and validity of marriages.42 It applies a different method than the 
other articles, that of ethnography combined with an empirical analysis of a 
large body of cases collected through the district courts and local register 
offices, and it explicitly adopts the approach of multi-sited ethnography. As 
the method of research adopted in Article I was different than in the other 
studies, the data will be described in more detail than it will be described in 
the context of Articles II to VI. 
Article I draws on several data sets, which began to be collected after May 
2016.43 These data include eight tape-recorded interviews with imams and 
other individuals affiliated with mosques44; four tape-recorded interviews 
with individual Muslim women45; and five tape-recorded interviews I 
conducted with staff at local register offices (maistraatti).46 In addition to the 
interviews that I conducted by myself or together with my colleague Dr. Al-
Sharmani, the article also draws on her extensive fieldwork and previous 
interviews with Muslim women and men on the themes of marriage and 
divorce. The interview guides we used were semi-structured and delved into 
the marriage conclusion47 practices (concerning both mosques and 
individuals) and the registration and recognition of family relationships in 
different contexts (local register offices). The analysis is also informed by four 
                                                 
42 This article was written last of the six articles and is still pending acceptance for 
publication. 
43 The article is written in collaboration between my on-going study on marriage practices, 
entitled ‘Governing plurality: Marriage practices and the law’, and two studies undertaken by 
my colleague and co-author Dr. Mulki Al-Sharmani. In the first one of these, Al-Sharmani 
studies the marriage norms and practices of Somalis in Finland; the interplay between 
marriage and divorce practices and the transnational family practices and ties of couples and 
families; and the ways in which women and men navigate multiple legal systems in processes 
of marriage and divorce. The project is entitled ‘Transnational Somali Muslim Families in 
Finland: Discourses and Realities of Marriage’, and it is undertaken together with Dr. 
Abdirashid Ismail. In the second one, which is entitled ‘Islamic Feminism: Tradition, 
Authority and Hermeneutics’, Al-Sharmani researches how contemporary Muslims in the 
transnational and national contexts of Egypt and Finland engage with their religious textual 
and legal tradition to address problematic issues pertaining to gender roles and relations, and 
their contestations over religious norms on marriage and divorce practices in light of their 
changing lived realities, and their acquiring new forms of religious knowledge. 
44 The interviews were conducted together with Dr. Al-Sharmani. 
45 The interviews were conducted together with Dr. Al-Sharmani. 
46 In addition to these interviews, the article draws on Al-Sharmani’s previous research in 
which she interviewed individuals and studied a mosque programme on family wellbeing 
through the method of participant observation. See: Mulki Al-Sharmani, ‘Striving against the 
'Nafs' Revisiting Somali Muslim Spousal Roles and Rights in Finland,’ Journal of Religion in 
Europe 8 (2015) 101; Al-Sharmani and Abdirashid Ismail, ‘Marriage and Transnational 
Family Life among Somali Migrants in Finland’ Migration Letters 14 (2017) 38-49; and Al-
Sharmani, ‘Muslim Family Wellbeing and Integration in Finland: The Role of Mosques’ in 
Marja Tillikainen, Mulki Al-Sharmani, and Sanna Mustasaari (eds.), Wellbeing of 
Transnational Muslim Families: Marriage, Law and Gender. Routledge, forthcoming.  
47 The term ‘marriage conclusion’ is established in scholarly discourse on religious 




unrecorded interviews and informal dicussions with lawyers at the public 
legal aid service, child supervisors, and NGOs. In addition to the interview 
data, the article draws on cases and documents I investigated in four Local 
register offices and three district courts. In order to examine the problems 
relating to the recognition of transnational family relationships in the 
contexts of registration of family relationships, investigation of marriage 
impediments and the confirmation of paternity, I went through 490 
document files of cases from 2016 and 2017 in the Local register office of 
Uusimaa (Uudenmaan maistraatti);48 563 document files from 2016 in the 
Local register office of Itä-Suomi (Itä-Suomen maistraatti);49 and 527 
document files from 2017 in the Local register office of Länsi-Suomi (Länsi-
Suomen maistraatti).50 In addition, I read through a total of 64 cases of 
annulment of paternity during 2014–2015 in three district courts.51 
The second site of the research is that of international law and the 
discourse of women’s rights in relation to culture, traditions and religion. 
This study, Article II, was written at the 2014 Centre of Studies and Research 
of the Hague Academy of International Law. The topic of the article was 
assigned to deal with the issue of whether culture, tradition or religion can 
justify treating women differently from men within family law. The article 
focuses on the issue of culture and human rights law through a discussion of 
the concept of equality underpinning the Convention on Elimination of 
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in the context of its Article 16, 
which addresses equality in the family and covers a wide range of issues from 
equal reproductive rights to equal parental rights and responsibilities, and in 
particular the economic consequences of marriage, family relations and their 
dissolution, an issue on which the Committee adopted its 29th General 
recommendation in 2013. The method and approach of the article is largely a 
review of existing feminist and family law literature and research on the 
context of culture and women’s rights, against which the discussion about 
equality and legitimacy of the CEDAW framework is set. Through its 
consideration of the CEDAW and the work of the Committee, the article 
analyses the hegemonic structures of human rights discourse, in particular 
                                                 
48 These documents were about the registration of family relationships. The files included 
correspondence between the Local register office and the customer in cases in which the 
registration applied for could not, for one reason or another, be carried out. In these cases a 
formal decision is very rarely made, but the correspondence is recorded in archives. The files 
may, for example, contain a request to provide further documents, or an announcement that 
the provided documentation is not considered reliable, for example because the person has 
not mentioned the relationship when interviewed by migration authorities at the time of first 
entry. 
49 These cases concerned the investigation of marriage impediments. The Local register 
office of Itä-Suomi is in charge of developing practices concerning the investigation of 
marriage impediments, which is why the study was undertaken there. 
50 These cases concerned the confirmation of paternity. There are approximately 10 000 
cases annually and majority of them is concentrated in the Local register office of Länsi-
Suomi. 
51 The cases make up 40 per cent of the total 160 cases in the whole country. The courts 
that formed the basis for the study were located in the Finnish cities of Helsinki, Tampere and 
Turku, which all have large immigrant populations relative to the rest of the country. The 
Helsinki District court is the largest of the 27 Finnish district courts, and its jurisdiction has 
the largest Muslim and immigrant populations. 
 
15 
tendencies to frame religion as irreconcible with equality, and the recognition 
of “counterhegemonic” identities.  
The third site in the set of studies is that of the migration laws of the 
Nordic countries concerning family reunifiction. Article III adopts an 
approach of descriptively reviewing the immigration regimes concerning 
marriage migration in the Nordic countries, all of which have introduced 
considerable restrictions in their Aliens Acts in recent years. The case also 
includes a note on the case of Biao v. Denmark, which was decided in the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 2016. 
The purpose of this article as part of this study is to offer a contextual 
background on the regulation of transnational families in migration laws of 
the Nordic countries and point out how the conceptions of belonging 
underpin these laws, as well as point to the struggles for recognition that were 
fought in the judgment of the ECtHR, particularly in the dissenting opinions. 
The article demonstrates, furthermore, that due to the current high 
expectations for income requirements, the right to family reunification 
remains unachievable for a significant number of third country nationals.  
The fourth site of the study is that of “court”, and particularly legal 
argumentation practised in the courts. Rather than understanding “court” 
here as a particular institution, the site of the court is constructed as a forum 
of argumentation in which legal norms are interpreted and the doctrine is 
enacted and re-enacted. At this site, Articles IV and V examine how, by 
invoking the discourses of status and relationship (or conduct, the word used 
for essentially the same phenomenon in Article IV), the tensions and 
intersections of different legal fields of private international law, family law 
and migration law are controlled and manipulated, while at the same time 
the image of unitary law is still rigidly maintained. Like articles IV and V, 
article VI too examines a case of family reunification, but this time the rights 
of the child and EU citizenship are central to the argument.  
In these three articles, the method is dogmatic in terms of describing the 
legal problem at the centre of the case. Articles V and VI each offer a close 
reading of a particular case, which was selected because it represented a 
theoretically fascinating problem and was decided at a normatively high level 
(national supreme instances and the EU Court of Justice). In order to situate 
these cases and describe the legal norms adequately, other case law and legal 
sources have been brought to bear. However, while the method of description 
is doctrinal, the method of analysis is not purely dogmatic.  
In the above I have described the data and methods of each study. The way 
in which this study combines methodologies of qualitative multi-sited 
ethnography and legal analyses of norms, doctrines and discourses in courts 
is also intrinsic to its overall methodology, which could generally be described 
as socio-legal. What ‘socio-legal’ means in this study refers beyond the 
methods adopted in each individual study, to the theoretical framework 
connecting these choices and ultimately to the way in which ‘law’ is 
understood in this study. The theoretical framework is important in 
explaining the connections between the legal fields and research sites as well 
as in connecting the findings to a larger socio-theoretical framework. In this 
work the theoretical framework is constructed around the question of the 
meaning and place of recognition relations and belonging in law, as well as 
the meaning and place of law in these relations. This theoretical framework 
Introduction 
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and the analytical sensibilities adopted in this study will be explained in 
chapter 2.  
1.3.2 RESEARCH ETHICS AND POSITIONALITY 
 
The study is conducted at four different sites and comprises different sets 
of material. The interviews, in particular, and also the cases and documents, 
include sensitive material and thus invoke the need to reflect research ethics 
and the positionality of the researcher.  
The interviews were conducted as part of an ongoing research project on 
transnational Muslim marriages.52 Ethical questions were raised when 
designing the research project and the ethical reflection is part of the research 
plan (composed in 2012). From the outset, the research team committed to 
following the guidelines laid out by the National Advisory Board on Research 
Ethics (2002) and the Academy of Finland (2003), and it was agreed that 
ethical issues were to be accorded the highest consideration since the focus is 
on marriage, which is an intimate and personal issue. The highly politicized 
nature of the topic of migration – in particular that of Muslim and Somali 
migration – was noted in the research plan.  
During the interviews, it was clearly stated that the research had no 
government involvement, and the background, aims, and nature of the 
research were disclosed to the interlocutors so that they were able to give their 
informed consent. Interlocutors were made aware of their right to withdraw 
from the research at any time, their consent was asked for when recording the 
interviews and at times taping was paused if the interlocutors so wished. The 
original names of the interlocutors were not attached to tapes or written data, 
and the data was anonymised. In the publications, pseudonyms were used 
where necessary and detailed background information was blurred to ensure 
anonymity. The draft version of Article I was sent to some of the interlocutors 
for review so that they were able to check that they agreed that the article could 
be published as part of this thesis. 
The results of the project have been and will be disseminated to the 
informants both individually and in seminars and meetings. In planning 
publications, we have been aware that the outcomes of a research project on 
Muslim marriage might be used in public discourse to “pathologize” the 
religious and cultural communities being studied. Therefore we have 
considered the form and forum for reporting the findings in a way that should 
enhance understanding of the interlocutors’ viewpoints. 
Research permits were applied for and obtained from four local register 
offices (Itä-Suomen maistraatti, Lounais-Suomen maistraatti, Länsi-
Suomen maistraatti and Uudenmaan maistraatti). They include permission 
to record the interviews but it was agreed that if the interviews were to be cited 
directly, the interlocutors would be consulted first. The research permits also 
grant me access to archives and documents. In writing my research notes and 
                                                 
52 Academy of Finland research project entitled ‘Transnational Muslim Marriages in 
Finland: Wellbeing, Law, and Gender’. The project is led by Dr. Marja Tiilikainen at the 
Department of Social Research, University of Helsinki. 
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publication I have committed to securing full anonymity of the individuals 
whose cases I examine. I also studied paternity annulment cases in three 
district courts (Helsingin käräjäoikeus in Helsinki, Pirkanmaan käräjäoikeus 
in Tampere and Varsinais-Suomen käräjäoikeus in Turku), for which 
research permits were not required. In local register offices and district courts 
I read the documents and took notes in the premises of the institutions, but I 
did not copy the material. For discretionary reasons, I also chose to anonymise 
the two cases subject to close reading in Articles V and VI. 
Another issue has to do with my own positionality and how it may have 
affected the interview situations, composition of the research, interview 
situations, and reflection on research. In Article I, we conducted the interviews 
with imams and four individual Muslim women together, but having much 
more experience on qualitative ethnography and trained as anthropologist, Dr. 
Al-Sharmani led the research and took the primary role in designing the 
interview guides. Furthermore, these interlocutors were found through her 
previous research contacts and networks. Together we were able to use 
Finnish, English, Somali and Arabic during the interviews, which enriched the 
interview material. Being accompanied by my senior colleague also helped 
remove the stigma of the stranger, both for the interlocutors and for myself. 
Thus, my positionality in these interviews was, to a large extent, determined 
by collaboration with my senior colleague. As these interviews only are a small, 
although important, component of the whole study, my positionality was not 
a cause for substantive reflection. 
The interviews conducted at local register offices were with officials and as 
such did not deal with sensitive issues, and thus my position as researcher was 
rather unproblematic. From the outset, I attended the virtual meetings (i.e. via 
a video link) of the steering group and the attitude towards my research was 
positive, as it was thought to have potential for developing better practices. 
With my legal training and interest in private international law and the 
everyday work done in the local register offices, there was an atmosphere of 
mutual trust and I felt welcome. Here too then, there was no cause for 
substantive reflection on my positionality. 
Since 2012 I have conducted interviews, participated in events and had 
numerous informal discussions with people. Much of these data and material 
are left outside the scope of the present study, although this material has 
obviously been informative in many ways as well as helping me to understand 
the processes that this study focuses on. For example, since April 2015 I have 
been conducting research on the experiences of individuals facing the process 
of family reunification and have interviewed individuals who are currently in 
the process or have experience of it. This ongoing research has required, and 
will require, plenty of reflection regarding my own positionality and power 
relations in the interaction with the interlocutors. For the purposes of the 
present study, however, these reflections have little if any relevance. 
Presumably, as my ongoing research and our joint research proceeds and I 
conduct more interviews independently, questions of positionality will become 
more urgent and will need more reflection.  
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 RECOGNITION, LAW, AND PRECARIOUS LIFE: THE 
PROBLEM OF BELONGING IN LAW 
The term recognition in this study refers to two different phenomena.53 Firstly, 
it refers to the pre-interpretative phase of classification, in which legal 
language is invoked to define the issue in question in legal terms. It is about 
meaning-making in the legal sphere. Secondly, the term as used in this study 
draws on the normative theory of ethical relations in society, in particular as 
developed by Axel Honneth. Recognition in both of these senses of the word 
has been impacted by globalisation and the intensification of transnational 
processes. As Hellum, Ali and Griffiths note, “transnationalization of personal, 
economic, communicative and religious relations has profoundly affected the 
role of state law and international law”, leading to diverse processes for the 
reconfiguration of regulatory domains.54  
2.1.1 RECOGNITION AND THE CONCEPT OF LAW: FROM “THE 
RULE OF RECOGNITION” TO INTERSECTING LEGALITIES AND 
REGIME COLLISIONS 
 
The move from non-legal to legal assumes the identification and invocation of 
a legal norm. In other words, phenomena assume existence in the legal sphere 
through recognition, either as autonomous legal concepts constituted by 
norms, relatively independent of ordinary language, or as facts that 
contextualise the invoked legal concept. In this respect, recognition concerns 
questions such as whether there is a marriage or whether family life exists. This 
transition into the legal sphere, and to a specific jurisdiction, also happens 
when the rules of private international law are invoked. In this case recognition 
has to do with whether the “foreign” institution, an individual’s formal status, 
for example is given legal significance and if it is, how and which rules are 
applied to situations that may arise in relations to that “foreign” institution. 
Within the context of migration, the question of recognition of relationships is 
similarly a question of identifying something as something and deciding what 
are the legal implications that follow from that identification. Recognition in 
                                                 
53 This is, of course, a simple way to express the different senses in which the term can be 
used and the way in which it is understood in this study. More differentiated acoounts of 
recognition have been developed. Ricouer for example speaks of three dimensions of 
recognition: recognition as reidentification, relation-to-self and reciprocal recognition, which 
is mediated by social norms. Paul Ricoeur. The Course of Recognition. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2007. 
54 Anne Hellum, Shaheen Sardar Ali and Anne Griffiths, 'Introduction: Transnational Law 
in the Making,' in Anne Hellum, Shaheen Sardar Ali and Anne Griffiths (eds.) From 
Transnational Relations to Transnational Laws: Northern European Laws at the 
Crossroads, 1-26. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011, 1. 
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this first sense is a question of identifying the rules that apply to the case in 
question and interpreting them.  
Recognition in this sense of identification and definition – the process in 
which the conditions according to which something has legal significance are 
set – has been a central concern in analytical jurisprudence, perhaps most 
famously formulated by H.L.A. Hart in The Concept of Law.55 According to 
Hart,  
 
in the day-to-day life of a legal system its rule of recognition is very 
seldom expressly formulated as a rule;…For the most part the rule 
of recognition is not stated, but its existence is shown in the way 
in which particular rules are identified, either by courts or other 
officials or private persons or their advisers.56  
 
Rule of recognition, as determined by Hart, is a social fact concerning how 
the normative matrix is constructed with respect to the merits of a particular 
case. In applying the rule of recognition the legal actor identifies not only the 
applicable legal norms but also the facts and elements of the event which are 
argued to have legal relevance. As understood by Hart, while the rule of 
recognition as applied in legal practice is often a social fact rather than a formal 
rule, it is nevertheless connected to the criteria of validity, which is specific to 
the particular legal order and jurisdiction. Unsurprisingly, then, this concept 
of law and legal recognition has been challenged by global legal pluralism as 
too narrow and state-centric.  
Increasing mobility over state borders and the transnational kinship 
networks emphasise the fact that instead of belonging to one normative 
system, both as legal subjects and culturally, religiously and ideologically, 
people and their families belong to various ‘normative orders’, both in terms 
of jurisdictions as well as in terms of ‘lived law’. Transnational family lives 
involve family practices and lives that are shaped by multiple localities, socio-
political contexts, policies, and laws. Individuals embedded in transnational 
family networks face the challenges of negotiating and navigating policies and 
laws of different countries and supranational legislative institutions, as well as 
their religiously and culturally based family practices, including marriage and 
divorce.57 
Indeed, globalisation and legal pluralism highlight the inadequacy of 
traditional legal distinctions and contest the adequacy of the state-centric 
conceptual framework of law regarding phenomena that cross jurisdictions, 
traditions and cultures.58  As Tuori points out, legal hybrids, by which he 
means legal concepts and instruments or even whole branches of law that 
elude the traditional legal systematics, including the distinction between 
municipal and international law, are characteristic of globalisation and 
                                                 
55 H.L.A. Hart. The Concept of Law. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961. 
56 Hart, 1961, 98. 
57 Mulki Al-Sharmani, Marja Tiilikainen and Sanna Mustasaari. 'Editorial - Transnational 
Migrant Families: Navigating Marriage, Generation and Gender in Multiple Spheres,' 
Migration Letters 14:1 (2017), 1-10. 
58 William Twining. General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global 
Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
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transnational law.59 As the normative sources and foundations of these hybrids 
do not necessarily exist in any predetermined relation, they invoke complex 
forms of interlegalities. For example, even though states have a wide margin of 
appreciation in deciding what are the constitutive normative requirements of 
a legally valid marriage, they may well be under an obligation to recognise non-
registered religious marriages on the basis of the right of the individual to equal 
treatment compared to married couples, in the context of pension provisions; 
the protection of family life; freedom of religion; or rights related to the 
position of being socially tied to an informal marriage, to mention just several 
examples.60 The legality arising from human rights law thus effectively 
transcends the border between the spheres of law and non-law and public and 
private. 
The same problematics of interlegality in a situation of intersecting and 
discrepant legal doctrines were also present in the case that first directed my 
attention to the issue of the recognition of family relationships in migration 
law – the recognition of forced and child marriage in family reunification. 
However, the contradiction in the case was not merely about the complexity of 
identifying legal norms applicable to the phenomenon of child or forced 
marriage in the context of multiple state legal systems, cultures, and lived 
realities. Additionally, and perhaps even more significantly, at issue was the 
norm collision educing from the drastic political conflict between the 
regulatory regimes of private law and human rights law, on the one hand, and 
migration law on the other hand.  
According to Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, globalisation has led to a 
functional differentiation of global social sectors and, consequently, to a 
drastic fragmentation of global law.61 Conflicting laws and norm collisions in 
contemporary world are no longer adequately understood merely as conflicts 
between (national or international) legal orders but should be understood as 
conflicts between regulatory regimes and their rationalities arising from the 
different social sectors. Fragmentation, according to Fischer-Lescano and 
Teubner, “has its origin in contradictions between society-wide 
institutionalized rationalities, which law cannot solve, but which demand a 
new legal approach to colliding norms”.62 Consequently, attempts to find unity 
in the legal system, whether through doctrinal logic or norm hierarchies, can 
only offer limited means to handle such conflicts. In order to understand what 
conflicts really are about, we need to understand the colliding social realities 
from which they spring.63  
In practice, of course, the challenges cast by legal pluralism and “regime 
collisions”64 overlap. However, the problem of regime collisions poses 
                                                 
59 Kaarlo Tuori. "Transnational Law: On Legal Hybrids and Perspectivism," in Miguel 
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and Legal Thinking, 11-47. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
60 Susan Rutten. 'Protection of Spouses in Informal Marriages by Human Rights,' Utrecht 
Law Review 6:2 (2010), 77-92. 
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Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law,’ Michigan Journal of International Law 25:4 
(2004), 999-1046. 
62 Ibid. 1004. 




challenges for recognition and belonging of a completely different type 
compared to the norm collisions resulting from pluralism or difficulties in 
defining legal concepts in cross-culturally salient terms. Consequently, they 
call for different approaches. In the first case, one might find practical and 
theoretically sound responses by developing and reworking legal concepts by 
means of analytical jurisprudence. Indeed, the challenge of globalisation has 
been picked up in the field of jurisprudence by authors such as Tamanaha,65 
von Daniels,66 and Twining,67 who have sought to develop legal concepts 
better placed to respond to the challenges of globalisation. For Twining, the 
contemporary challenge for general analytical jurisprudence is to develop a 
conceptual framework in which terms and concepts could retain usability in 
cross-cultural and transnational legal discourses.68  
However, in the second case, what is needed is an identification of 
standards for immanent critique which would constitute a justified and 
rational claim within the critiqued relations themselves. It is for this purpose 
that the second sense of the word recognition is invoked in this study, that is, 
recognition as ethical relations that constitute social and legal relations and 
practices of law.69 
2.1.2 RECOGNITION RELATIONS AS ESTABLISHED ETHICAL 
RELATIONS IN SOCIETY 
 
In the second sense of the term, as used in this study, ‘recognition’ refers to 
the practical self-relation of subjects in society as well as to their reciprocal 
recognition.70 Recognition in this sense relates, on the one hand, to the theory 
of social justice, wellbeing, human rights, and legal pluralism and, on the other 
hand, to the social integration in the sphere of legal relations. Recognition 
theory became central in political theories in the 1990s at the same time with 
increased focus on multiculturalism. An influental essay by Taylor, 
‘Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition’,71 brought to the fore the 
vitality of the human need for recognition and thus misrecognition as a specific 
                                                 
65 Brian Z. Tamanaha. A General Jurisprudence of Law and Society. Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001. 
66 Detlef Von Daniels. The Concept of Law from a Transnational Perspective. Farnham; 
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67 Twining 2009. 
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69 Axel Honneth. The 'I' in 'we': Studies in the Theory of Recognition. Cambridge: Polity 
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form of ‘harm’, and since then a vast amount of research has focused on the 
themes of recognising, accommodating and respecting difference.  
The body of literature and number of theoretical exchanges relating to how 
the role of recognition should be perceived in theories of social justice is 
enormous and covers complex issues, such as how we should conceptualise 
contemporary capitalism. The most famous exchange concerning the 
paradigms of redistribution and recognition and their role in critical theory of 
social justice is the one between Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser.72 While both 
authors agree that recognition and redistribution are central in addressing 
injustices, Fraser argues that redistribution and recognition are irreducible as 
elements of justice, whereas Honneth argues that a sufficiently differentiated 
theory of recognition is able to address injustices in distribution; issues of 
distribution are thus derivative to recognition.73  
 In order to go deeper into the issue of which theory of social justice, in the 
abstract, is most salient and to the relation of redistribution and recognition 
in such theory, we would need to be able to analyse, for example, how culture 
and economy interact and what role cultural patterns play in the organisation 
of contemporary capitalism. While such analysis is not within the scope of this 
study, it should be mentioned that, in my view, both Fraser and Honneth fail 
to offer a convincing account of the processes of neoliberal capitalism and the 
role of cultural patterns in these processes. While Honneth’s approach might 
be accused of cultural determinism, Fraser’s approach, which claims that 
’cultural’ and ’economic’ need to be analytically separated, has likewise faced 
criticism.74 However, in my view, the most crucial shortcoming regarding the 
depiction of capitalism in their exchange has to do with the neglect of viewing 
neoliberal capitalism as complex and interlinked processes and realignments 
that have to do with knowledge production. If neoliberalism is approached as 
a form of governmentality, as for example Byrne has recently suggested, 
processes such as subjectivation become central in analyses of capitalism.75 
When analysed in the framework of governmentality and subject-production, 
the role of ‘culture’ in economic processes will assume an entirely different 
meaning. In this context, Fischer-Lescano and Teubner’s account of 
fragmentation of global law as taking place due to the differentiation of global 
social sectors and their distinct rationalitionalities is informative, as it speaks 
to the issue of selective networking between different rationalities. It is thus 
unlikely that any pre-defined relation could be identified between cultural and 
economic processes.76 
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In this study, recognition theory is invoked to study the conflicts between 
regimes and their foundations in relation to the question of how axes of 
inclusion and exclusion are drawn, how the community, the ‘we’, is defined 
and what are the institutional discourses and rationalities that constitute the 
relationship of belonging (or non-belonging) between the individual and the 
community. In her theory of social justice and globalisation, Fraser has 
discussed this matter of ‘who’ should count as a member and ‘which’ is the 
relevant community, noting “it is not only the substance of justice, but also the 
frame, which is in dispute”.77 In her theory of “post-Westphalian democratic 
justice”, Fraser suggests that in this context the most crucial issue has to do 
with relations of representation. She divides the issue of unjust relations of 
representation into two forms of misrepresantion: the ordinary political form 
and the boundary-setting form, which she calls the problem of misframing.78 
In the boundary-setting aspect of representation, various politics of framing 
are at play, and the aim of critical theory is to democratise these processes of 
frame-setting.79 Fraser’s theory renders social movements central for resisting 
injustices, also in the transnational public sphere. Honneth, on the contrary, 
does not explicitly address the issue of society’s boundaries. One significant 
difference between Fraser and Honneth, however, has to do with their takes 
on how the experience of injustice can be articulated in the public space. 
Honneth holds it necessary that institutionally caused suffering is examined 
“prior to and independently of political articulation by social movements”. 80 
The issue of inclusion and exclusion are thus implicit in his account of 
intersubjective recognition, which is why I find Honneth’s approach more 
suitable for the purposes of addressing the questions at the centre of this study. 
This, however, is not to say that redistribution or participatory parity would be 
unimportant aspects of social justice or that practical solutions to injustices 
should always be found through focusing on recognition alone, quite the 
contrary.  
In The Struggle for Recognition,81 Honneth draws on Hegel in arguing 
that a solid theory of ethical life ought to be grounded on understanding that 
the struggle for intersubjective recognition lies at the core of social conflicts. 
The moral order of society, according to Honneth, is a historically established, 
fragile structure of graduated relations of recognition. Honneth notes that 
Hegel’s attempt to ground social theory on the struggle for recognition marked 
a significant shift in classical political philosophy which, in the historical 
development from the Middle Ages to Renaissance, had come to assume a 
                                                 
77 Nancy Fraser. ‘Reframing justice in a globalizing world,’ in Terry Lovell (ed.), 
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permanent state of hostile competition between subjects (Machiavelli, 
Hobbes) as natural order of things. In this conception, the central struggle was 
self-preservation in the conditions of the war of all against all, and the purpose 
of the law was to solve this ever-enduring conflict by means of social 
contract.82  
Instead of grounding the theory of society on social contract necessary for 
the purposes of self-interest and self-preservation, the Hegelian basis of 
Honneth’s theory bases the theory of society on reciprocal relations between 
subjects. For Hegel, “the emergence of social contract – and, thereby of legal 
relations –represents a practical event that necessarily follows from the initial 
social situation of the state of nature itself”.83 Honneth cites Hegel: 
 
Law [Recht] is the relation of persons, in their conduct, to others, 
the universal element of their free being or the determination, the 
limitation of their empty freedom. It is not up to me to think up 
or bring about this relation or limitation for myself; rather, the 
subject matter [Gegenstand] is itself this creation of law in 
general, that is, the recognizing relation.84 
 
According to Honneth’s interpretation, for Hegel, the subject’s self-
consciousness is pre-moral in nature: the only way for a subject to realize him- 
or herself is in interaction with another subject, through which the acceptance 
of limited selfhood is necessary for the self to be born. Recognition thus refers 
to the “reciprocal limitation of one’s own, egocentric desires for the benefit of 
the other” – even if this recognition is reactive at this point.85 In this initial 
stage of struggle for recognition, the subject comes to realize recognition as a 
constitutive element of love, as the independence of the subjected is guided 
and supported by care and affective relations. These primary struggles for 
recognition never extend beyond primary relationships, but they remain the 
foundational core of all ethical life, as in these primary struggles the subject is 
born as autonomous and individual. The nature of this individuality and 
autonomy, however, is profoundly relational. This primary sphere of affect 
forms the basic conditions of subjective agency and thus the core of ethical 
subjectivity. 
The struggle for recognition proceeds from the primary personal sphere of 
love to other areas of life. The role of conflict is central to an understanding of 
how ethical relations evolve. Through mutual recognition, subjects 
continuously learn new dimensions of themselves, which causes a need to 
”leave, by means of conflict, the stage of ethical life they had reached, in order 
to achieve the recognition of a more demanding form of their individuality”.86 
The cause for conflict is the struggle for recognition, and is not merely a matter 
of self-preservation. A contract can thus never definitively solve and end these 
struggles. Law, according to this line of thinking, is a means of moving beyond 
established ethical relations. 
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Ethical recognition relations, according to Honneth, are differentiated into 
three interlinked spheres of recognition, each of which has a differentiated 
social basis and role in the maintenance of personhood as self-relation (Figure 
1): love and intimate relationships, in which the central ethical principle is 
responsiveness to the needs of the other; respect, in which the central ethical 
principle is legal equality; and esteem, in which the central ethical principle is 
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Moral progress in the established ethical relations is possible through two 
types of recognition struggles: The subject can claim that aspects of her or his 
personality should be recognised (expansion in the substance of recognition, 
what it means to be a fully-fledged citizen), or opportunities for social 
inclusion can increase so that more people are included in society as fully-
fledged citizens.  
With the introduction of the modern notion of legal equality, the place of 
status in defining the scope of legal subjectivity was radically changed. A 
differential status system as the basis of rights was replaced by the single 
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uniform status of citizenship.88 In the earlier “feudal” system89 of status 
differentiation, equal rights depended on status associated with for example 
class, role and family, allowing, for example, political participation “only to 
those who could demonstrate a certain measure of income or property”.90 
Importantly, however, inequality in the form of different degrees of social 
value and appreciation was not eliminated from the social system. Instead, 
recognition in the sphere of social esteem is mediated by achievement, the 
ability to contribute, for example by profession and labour, to the value 
community of society. 
Struggles for recognition in the legal sphere are about what it means to be 
equal in legal relations, i.e. what differences in opportunities and identities are 
included in the definition of what it means to be equal. But they are also about 
who is included in the sphere of legal relations. According to Honneth,  
In legal recognition, two operations of consciousness flow together, so 
to speak, since, on the one hand, it presupposes moral knowledge of the 
legal obligations that we must keep vis-à-vis autonomous persons, 
while, on the other hand, it is only an empirical interpretation of the 
situation that can inform us whether, in the case of a given concrete 
other, we are dealing with an entity possessed of the quality that makes 
these obligations applicable.91 
 
Moral development in the sphere of legal relations is about gradual 
extension as to who may claim to be treated as an equal legal subject and what 
it means to be one. This however, tells us little about why or how we could 
contest the border of the community. Recognition, in the sense of ethical 
relations, is the act that gives birth to reciprocal subjectivity, to the “I” in the 
“We”, but this recognition inevitably includes a negation, as it invokes the 
border inherent in the definition of community. 
2.1.3 TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES, PRECARIOUS LIFE AND THE 
QUESTION OF LEGAL RECOGNITION 
 
As was noted above with regard to different forms of norm collision and 
intersecting legalities, the two senses of ‘recognition”’ are interlinked in this 
study. Transnational families often lead lives that within the social hierarchies 
of our societies become understood as precarious or unworthy of protection 
provided by law. All life is precarious, as Butler notes, and should be 
apprehended as such, by which she means that in order to be sustained as life, 
certain social and economic conditions need to be met. Life beyond the 
recognition framework, however, is difficult to recognise as life and as worthy 
of protection. She argues that “there ought to be a more inclusive and 
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egalitarian way of recognising precariousness, and that this should take form 
as concrete social policy regarding such issues as shelter, work, food, medical 
care, and legal status.”92  
Inclusions within the ethical relations of recognition may at times mean 
being regulated and recognised by legal norms, while at other times such 
regulation may mark exclusion and recognition as non-belonging. All three 
legal fields of this study refer to different foundations as their basic moral 
recognition relations. However, in none of these fields is law a unitary, 
coherent system, but rather an internally plural construct, which includes 
various legalities. These different legalities, and the recognition relations they 
reflect, also construct subjectivity and personhood differently, locate the 
border of the community differently, and thus produce different forms of 
belonging. These intersectional “belongings” provide the focus for this study. 
In the operations of the law, unity is produced between these legalities through 
a process referred to as interlegality.93 The relations between these legalities 
and intersecting subjectivities are constructed in legal decision-making as 
being in fixed relations within a pre-existing and objective normative matrix, 
against which the merits of an individual case are evaluated.  
Recognition relations, which law institutionalises through its operations 
are constructed both at the level of codified norms and at the level of practice. 
Like recognition, then, belonging refers to two different operations of 
exclusion and inclusion. It refers, firstly, to identification – the process by 
which phenomena of our social world are defined and located within social 
relations as belonging to this instead of that category or unit of analysis. 
Secondly, belonging refers to the more fundamental issue of whether one is 
considered belonging in the sphere of solidarity, in the ‘we’ that is the 
precondition for legal existence. As the analyses provided in the six articles of 
this study demonstrate, often these two senses of belonging and recognition 
are inseparable. Belonging in both of these senses legitimizes legal operations, 
e.g. legislation or decision-making in an individual case. 
According to Yuval-Davis et al, “it is impossible to understand the ways 
individual people and groupings relate to and are being treated by both state 
and society these days just by being related to as either citizens and/or having 
specific ethnic, national or racial identities. The politics of belonging 
encompass and relate both citizenship and identity, adding an emotional 
dimension which is central to notions of belonging.”94 By studying how 
belonging and non-belonging become articulated, anticipated and produced in 
and by legal discourses and practices, this study analyses the politics of 
belonging as they emerge in legal struggles.  
Recognition theory is a normative theory of society. For transnational 
families the core question is how society is defined and what are the conditions 
of being recognised as a member of the authorised “we”. 95 Citizenship can be 
approached from an internal or endogenous perspective where it designates a 
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universal subject position. But it can also be approached with a focus on its 
purpose as erecting and maintaining the boundaries of the communities, both 
internally and externally. In essence, then, what is at stake is not only 
transnational families or the precariousness attached to the diverse situations 
connected to transnational life. Rather, what is at stake is how “we” are defined 
as a community, in relation to transnational families and the precariousness of 
life.  
In the following two sections (2.2 and 2.3), the theoretical and analytical 
sensibilities necessary for analysing recognition relations and belonging are 
introduced. The way in which ‘legality’ and the presence of law in society are 
understood and approached in this study will be addressed first. After that the 
theoretical approach of feminist intersectionality will be introduced as means 
of interrogating the discrepancies of law in in everyday life and legal doctrine.  
2.2 INQUIRIES INTO ’LEGALITY’ AND THE ANALYTIC 
OF STRUGGLE 
Law recognises and regulates family life and relationships in myriad and 
sometimes contradictory ways. However, this incoherence, the “normal chaos 
of family law”,96 is not necessarily a weakness of law or indication of biases 
within it. Rather, discontinuities and incoherence make law viable and open 
to different interpretations as well as capable of adapting to new 
circumstances.97 Accordingly, the mere lack of coherence in political and legal 
approaches to family is not a focal point of analysis in this study because the 
prevailing social inequalities and marginalisation could be explained by 
incoherence. Instead, the crucial question is how the diversity and internal 
contradictions in the ways in which the legality of family relationships is 
constructed enable or constrain agency, and how these constructions play out 
to produce social marginalisation and direct control on some families and 
individuals more than others. It is thus necessary to reflect on the theoretical 
approaches to ‘law’ and ‘legality’ adopted in this study. There are three main 
points that I want to raise. Firstly, legality is a socially constructed resource for 
meaning making, which derives from several sources. Secondly, the normative 
unity and universalism of law, while illusory from certain perspectives and 
often capable of legitimising hegemonic power relations, are necessary for the 
law as a discourse of justification but also crucial for understanding law as a 
social practice. Thirdly, while legal recognition alone is unable to guarantee 
substantive equality, it is nevertheless the gate to a position from which law 
and for example its lacks of legitimacy can be challenged, and as such it is a 
necessary condition of resistance to law. 
Article I analyses the legality of marriage as socially constructed within 
processes where different actors (religious actors, individuals and state 
officials) draw on religious, moral and legal discourses. The article examines 
the ways in which these actors understand legality and legal authority and how 
they become involved in legal processes. According to Moore, law is internally 
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plural and depends on other normative systems as well as dynamic 
interactions between the fields and actors in them; it is a process in which the 
relationship between the individual and the legal structure is mutually 
constitutive.98 Like Moore, Ewick and Silbey understand the relationship 
between the individual and social structure, such as ‘law’, as one that is 
mutually defining rather than oppositional.99 Different thresholds as to which 
legal means are practically available to people also strongly shape the ways in 
which arrangements, obligations or entitlements can become legally contested. 
The analysis provided in the article concludes, in line with many previous 
contributions in the scholarship,100 that nuanced and empirically grounded 
research is needed for understanding the role and function of legality in 
discourses of law and religion. Article II continues with the theme by exploring 
the intersections of international law, women’s rights, equality and religious 
family law. 
Article II offers a reading of the scholarship that seeks to reclaim the 
universalism of human rights and introduces some of the criticism put forward 
by feminist scholars of prevailing understandings of gender equality, which 
operate in complex ways and cannot be caught in binaries such as religion vs. 
rights. From a different perspective than the one offered in Article I, it draws 
on the idea that legality is not bound to institutions and then simply inserted 
in social situations. Rather, legality is socially constituted through actions and 
practices connected to systems of meaning-making.101 Empirical studies, such 
as Bano’s theoretically ambitious analyses,102 have highlighted that without 
knowing how normative practices actually impact individuals’ lives and how 
the various hierarchies of power actually operate, we simply lack the basis for 
making principled decisions about how the relationship between different 
normative orders should be organized. Liberal legal instruments, such as the 
human rights of women, may potentially hinder emancipation and even 
contribute to reproducing prevailing hierarchies. As Ewick and Silbey note: 
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By effacing the connections between the concrete/particular and 
the transcendent/general, hegemonic ideologies conceal social 
organization. As a consequence, power and privilege are 
preserved through what appears to be the irreconcilability of the 
particular and the general.103  
 
Legal pluralism104  has at times been criticised for a lack of conceptual 
clarity with respect to distinguishing “law” from other forms of social life. In 
this study, legal authority and legality are understood as coming about through 
practical engagement with the multiple sources of law, rather than existing as 
pre-defined in institutions; in other words the approach adopted to legal 
pluralism is constitutive.105 As Banakar notes regarding globalisation, “the 
understanding of law as a nationally based body of legal rules, sources and 
institutions has come to be contested by forms of law and legality originating 
from multiple sources inside and outside nation states”.106 Analyses in Articles 
I and II, in particular, demonstrate that the legality of relationship is not a 
question of separate systems of law but rather complex structures that 
intertwine to produce legality.  
However, the need to distinguish between ‘law’ and other spheres depends 
on the construction of the research site and the focus of the examination. 
Articles III to VI focus on the legal sphere as constituted in specific legal 
institutions and ‘legality’ within these analyses stands for distinctly positive 
norms of state law. These articles too, however, approach legality from a 
perspective that recognises the importance of practices as grounding the law 
in society and the struggles prevailing in it. Hence, at the same time as legality 
shapes social relations, it “must also be continually produced and worked on 
(i.e. invoked and deployed) by individual and group actors”.107 The changes in 
legality result from the variation in its local enactment. 108 The logic of the 
juridical field has been explained by Bourdieu as 
 
determined by two factors: on the one hand, by the specific power 
relations which give it its structure and which order the 
competitive struggles (or, more precisely, the conflicts over 
competence) that occur within it; and on the other hand, by the 
internal logic of juridical functioning which constantly constrains 
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the range of possible actions and, thereby, limits the realm of 
specifically juridical solutions.109  
 
Central to the theoretical approach adopted in this study is that there are 
different, albeit equally important and “true” ways of understanding legality 
and the processes generating and reproducing it. The classification provided 
by Ewick and Silbey is used here as a “triptych” to describe the relevance of 
these different positions to this study, although I wish to make no definitive 
claim as to what forms of legal consciousness actually can be found in social 
relations. Ewick and Silbey introduce three ways of participating in the 
construction of legality, that each invoke “a particular cluster of cultural 
schemas and resources that position the law and the individual in relation to 
one another”.110 The first of these positions, “before the law”, depicts law as an 
autonomous field separated from ordinary life. This reflects the self-
understanding of liberal law as universal and capable of subsuming the 
particularities of who, when, and where to general norms and thus 
maintaining the legitimacy of power.111 
Legitimacy of the law is produced by distinctions irreducible to mere 
general recognition of the universality of these distinctions, which the 
professional ideology presents as the expression of universal and eternal 
values, transcending individual interests and particular circumstances. But 
neither is juridical legitimacy a mere product of power relations. Law, in the 
sense of pre-determined doctrine, is neither reducible to power relations nor 
independent of them.112 As García-Villegas points out,  
 
the legal field in its majesty, its rites, and its shrines is not 
amenable to being reduced merely to existing economic forces… 
Neither is law pure erudition that can be detached from the social 
conditions in which it is found. These extremes ignore the 
existence of law understood as a social field that is relatively 
independent of external demands. 113 
 
Hurri’s views legal practice as critical for law’s very existence - both in its 
normative dimension and within society. His approach is relevant for the 
present study, as this perspective opens a venue for analysing legal 
argumentation as a process in which the pre-existing doctrine is invoked and 
pragmatically deployed. By adopting this analytical approach the pivotal 
points in the process, in which novel meanings are attached to the “omni-
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historical”114 body of law and legal doctrine, can be detected. In Hurri’s account 
of legal practice, the battles taking place in the legal field are what grounds the 
law in the reality of society.115 In this process, the antagonism between law 
understood as a universal system of rights and law understood as state power 
is overcome. As Hurri states,  
 
rights are no longer presuppositions of lawyers who act in the field 
of their own practice, but crucial elements in the mechanisms of 
that field, something without which the whole apparatus would 
not only not function, but also not exist in the reality of society.116   
 
The second form of legal consciousness described by Ewick and Silbey, 
namely that of “with the law” consciousness, depicts the strategic element of 
law, which is less concerned with the legitimacy and more concerned with 
strategic opportunities that legal argumentation opens up for different actors 
to pursue their own ends.117 This aspect of the law is crucial also to Hurri’s 
depiction of law. Hurri sees legal practice as a space of struggles where the 
juridical field operates as the action-structuring media.118 These struggles are 
interconnected to a variety of social and individual struggles, both internal and 
external to legal means and ends. Without adopting a purely external 
perspective on law, this approach seeks to make visible how the conflicts of 
value prevailing in other fields of society enter the legal system through the 
legal practice. In the present study, the tensions between different recognition 
orders that the different regimes underlying for example liberal family law and 
immigration control are a focal concern of the analysis.  
The struggle perspective on law renders visible how these regimes intersect 
and how the tensions between them are governed thorugh the legal practice. 
Through a close reading of legal argumentation in one particular case, articles 
V and VI draw on the account of practice as developed by Hurri in that they 
seek to interrogate how legal subjectivities are formed in the legal 
argumentation in of the court and which regimes and extra-legal political goals 
are mobilised in the discursive practice of legal argumentation. Sameness and 
difference, and universal and particular, play out in the legal argumentation 
not necessarily according to an objective and impartial rationality of “law”, but 
often in ways that reproduce social hierarchies prevailing in society. The art of 
the legal profession is in performing the acts of constructing the normative 
framework in a seemingly objective manner and interpreting it from a similarly 
performed objective position.  
The third form of legal consciousness, “against the law” consciousness119, is 
about resistance. For the purposes of this study, interesting in against the law-
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consciousness is the way in which it is related to recognition. This link between 
power, resistance and recognition has been developed by Harding in her 
influential work on the regulation of sexuality.120 Drawing on a Foucauldian 
analysis of power as creative and productive and Butler’s understanding of 
recognition as a necessary condition for resistance in this particular type of 
power relationship, Harding emphasises the link between being recognised by 
power and being able to resist it: 
 
Resistance can only happen from within normative frameworks 
not from outside. When positioned outside law, when formal 
equality is denied, resistance to the power of law has to be focused 
on gaining entry to law, otherwise resistance to (hetero)normative 
structures such as marriage has little potential to significantly 
impact on or transform the institution. 
 
These interconnections between recognition and the production of legality, 
hegemony and counterhegemony demonstrate the urgency of taking into 
account the structural constraints on individual action and invoking a 
counterhegemonic consciousness in legal thought.121 Intersectionality, 
especially as developed in feminist theory, is an approach that seeks to render 
visible the myriad ways in which individuals are situated within various 
nexuses of power and how these different locations constitute privilege and 
disadvantage in various ways. In the next section, the concept of 
intersectionality will be explained briefly in order to provide some background 
for how intersectionality is applied in the articles and the analysis in chapter 
3. 
2.3 FEMINIST INTERSECTIONALITY 
 
Since ‘legality’ is approached in this study as something socially constructed in 
diverse discourses both within the sphere of official law and in the 
consciousness of different legal actors, an intersectional approach is needed to 
map the ways in which different people encounter law and how and why their 
(transnational) family relationships come to assume a legal character at 
different sites. This is important as law has both emancipatory and 
constraining effects, which due to diverse structural constraints impact 
individuals differently. As de Hart, van Rossum and Sportel note, this is not 
merely about constraints on mobility or strategic action such as forum 
shopping, but about the position of individuals in the family and the extent to 
which they are subject to particular forms of power and control, depending on 
their various positionalities.122   
The concept of intersectionality was first coined by Kimberlé Williams 
Crenshaw in 1989 in the context of the struggles of African American women 
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against discriminatory recruitment practices. While anti-discrimination law of 
the time could only deal with the categories of gender and race separately, 
Crenshaw sought to address overlapping or intersecting social identities and 
related systems of oppression that reciprocally constructed the difference of 
treatment.123 Crenshaw’s point, initially, was to address the issue of 
inersectional invisibility; that experiences of disadvantage were “the product 
of both [gender and race] and equivalence of neither”.124 Since the early 1990s, 
intersectional approaches have become central in contemporary feminist 
(legal) scholarship.125  
In this study, intersectionality is applied as an “analytic sensibility”,126 
which seeks to address the dynamics of difference and sameness and expose 
how single-axis thinking in terms of categories of difference “undermine legal 
thinking, disciplinary knowledge production, and struggles for social 
justice.”127 I understand intersectionality as “a deconstructive move” through 
which  “challenging the sameness/difference paradigms in law” becomes 
possible.128 Intersectionality as an approach focuses on the interplay of social 
structures and hierarchically organized categories, such as those created by 
legal practice.129  
With a focus on how difference and sameness play out in legal 
argumentation, the question of which categories to include or whether to focus 
on categories at all, loses some of its significance.130 Rather, intersectionality 
denotes relationality and fluidity of identity and experience.131 For example, as 
explained in Article I, ‘legality’ of Muslim marriages is intersected by identity 
and experiece, but also by transnationalism, which may place the marriages in 
intersecting registers and nexus of power relations that cannot be explained 
merely by reference to religious or secular law. Neither are these experiences 
reducible to an understanding of disadvantage as produced by multiple 
categories simply being added to one another. Intersectionality is needed to 
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render visible the techniques and tactics through which hierarchies are 
generated and maintained in law. These processes, such as “moral 
gatekeeping” in the field of immigration control,132 produce intersectional 
advantage and disadvantage based on the mutual and co-constitutive effect of 
gender, perceived roles in the family, economic position, and cultural 
“otherness”.133 
Intersectional approaches highlight the need to examine academic and 
disciplinary conventions critically, as these are part of the processes of 
knowledge production that institutionalise and reify existing hierarchies. The 
exclusive focus on state-centred legal processes as well as institutions and 
abstractions over lived experiences epitomise the excluding of other forms of 
knowledge from that which is considered the proper domain of the legal. Both 
transnationalism studies and the intersectional approach emphasise the need 
to shift the focus from institutions to forms of agency, and from a doctrinal 
level onto people, experiences and practices. Levitt and Jaworsky emphasise 
the centrality of simultaneity and embeddedness to transnationalism studies 
and highlight that there are variations in the consequences of 
transnationalism.134 Intersectionality is thus relevant also to the meta-
methodological choice of studying transnational family relationships, 
belonging and law at different ‘sites’ and with different methodologies. 
Due to the dialogical nature of their operations, categories of social 
difference produce unique forms of advantage and disadvantage. This point 
relates to the concept of equality. For example, within the framework of the 
CEDAW, there have been theorisations that incorporate intersectionality into 
the concept of substantive equality as well as to the means of promoting it. 
These will be discussed further in the following chapter. 
Intersectional approaches seek to address the anti-essentialist critique that 
for any form of social life to meet a category means that this order of categories 
is first imposed on social agents.135 In this process, the experiences of people 
who are situated at the intersections of various hierarchies are excluded and 
rendered invisible. This problem of “inadequate recognition of complexly 
situated subject” is visible throughout the study.136  
A critical point in intersectional approaches is to acknowledge that 
intersectionality operates within the same field of power it seeks to criticise. 
There are disciplining aspects within intersectionality discourses, and thereby 
a risk that intersectionality becomes the “product of the regime in which it 
operates and which it was conceived to contest”.137 This study documents this 
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effect, for example, in the rights discourse. It is shown that intersectional 
methods – such as the principle of the best interests of the child – when 
constructed in specific fields, become part of the power relations of that 
field.138 The study thus critically engages with the possibility to use 
intersectionality as a tool for better recognition of identities, as often the 
identities are pre-determined in law, and the legal discourse merely produces 
and imposes this identity on the subject. 
Intersectionality has also been criticised for inherent limitations as to 
explaining wider structural contexts. This study takes this critique into 
account and seeks to, through the construction of its methodological and 
theoretical framework, reach beyond the “occasions” in which inequalities are 
produced. Connecting intersectionality to the recognition theoretical 
framework of the study is an attempt towards connecting intersectional, 
occasional emergence of inequality to wider structures and ethical relations of 
society. 
The following chapter examines how intersectionality manifests in the 
analyses of this study, and which techiniques of governance an intersectional 
inquiry renders visible. 
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3 FAMILIES AND BELONGING: 
INTERSECTIONAL INQUIRIES 
It was noted in the introduction (1.1.1) that despite being treated as strictly 
separated fields of law, family law, private international law and migration law 
are intertwined in a number of ways. Applying the analytic sensibility of 
intersectionality, the present study examines some of these interconnections.  
This chapter begins by examining the framework of recognition relations 
in each of the three legal fields. It studies the images of community and 
individuals that the theoretical and legal doctrinal foundations of the fields 
rest upon. The focus is on how the relationship of belonging between the 
individual and the community are constructed by these foundations, 
particularly in the discourses of status and relationship within which family 
relations are recognised and regulated in law (3.1). The following sections 
examine how intersectionality manifests itself and which techniques of 
government it renders visible in the analyses of the study.  
Section 3.2 draws on Articles I and II in examining how the fact that 
individuals are intersectionally positioned directs legal control, how it may 
affect the ways in which the legality of relationships, marriage in particular, is 
constructed, and how individuals may access ‘legality’. Section 3.3 then 
focuses on intersecting legal fields in the light of analyses provided in Articles 
IV and V and studies the techniques through which fundamental conflicts 
between these fields are effaced, and unity and coherence of the law is secured. 
The final section 3.4 draws on Articles III and VI in looking at how the 
structural starting point of rights as exceptions in migration law produces the 
“alien” family. It examines, in particular, the principle of the best interests of 
the child as a technique of legal inspection, in which the intersectional identity 
of the individual is recognised as “alien”.  
 
3.1 RECOGNITION RELATIONS IN THE THREE LEGAL 
FIELDS OF THE STUDY 
The establishment and functioning of the capitalist order, according to 
Honneth, is dependent upon not only the imperative of constant realization of 
capital but upon a particular moral logic, gradually institutionalised as a 
recognition order. As was explained above, Honneth describes a modern 
capitalist society as an institutionalized recognition order based on three 
spheres of recognition (love, respect, and esteem). In the sphere of love and 
affective relationships, the central principle of recognition is the recognition 
of needs; in the sphere of legal relations, subjects gain self-respect by learning 
to refer to each other as equal and autonomous legal subjects; and in the 
sphere of achievement, subjects earn self-esteem by contributing to the 
common good as subjects who possess abilities and talents that are valuable 
for society. In different areas of life, these spheres overlap. The bourgeois 
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nuclear family, for example, is an institution in which the recognition principle 
of love has been gradually complemented by the legal regulation of 
intrafamilial interactions, the principle of equality.139 Legal recognition of 
kinship and regulation of the family, at least ideally, protects the equality of 
the members of the family.140 
Just as no single unitary ‘concept of family’ can be identified in law, no 
single rationality or mind of law can be traced as underlying the legal 
regulation of family relationships. For different purposes and aims, different 
elements of ‘familyhood’ are constitutive of legally recognisable family 
relationships. The main lines of thinking around the concept of family, 
however, can be identified in legal thought. These are status, a discourse in 
which family relationships are recognised and registered according to pre-
existing norms that define the outer limits of family, and relationship, a 
discourse that focuses on the quality of the relationship and seeks to evaluate 
real-life dependencies and affective ties between individuals together with the 
intensity of these ties. These discourses addressing status and relationship are 
intertwined and in various ways bound up with moral criteria of acceptability 
and normality. 
This section examines recognition relations underlying liberal family law, 
private international law and migration law by looking at how the discourses 
of status and relationship emerge in the constitution of personhood, 
subjectivity and community in these fields. By examining the normative 
expectation of ‘nation’ inherent in thinking about law through the paradigm of 
society as nation-state, the section seeks to make sense of the ways in which 
belonging is understood in these three fields of law.  
3.1.1 RECOGNITION RELATIONS IN LIBERAL FAMILY LAW 
 
The past decades in the development of family law manifest a particular kind 
of ethical progress in which legal equality within the family sphere has 
gradually expanded. In most Western capitalist societies the wellbeing of the 
individual has replaced other justifications of family law, such as upholding 
certain social structures or maintaining the doctrinal purity of an enclosed 
normative system.141 This ‘wellbeing rationale’ in legal governance in capitalist 
welfare states is an expression of intermeshing recognition principles that find 
articulation in several different contexts. Examples are many and include at 
least the following broad trends. The nuclear family is being 
deinstitutionalised, and marriage and divorce deregulated; and 
simultaneously with the decreasing of the focus on the sexual relationship 
between adults, the position and rights of the child has become central in the 
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regulation of the family.142 All in all, discrimination based on categories such 
as sexual orientation or the origin of the child born in or out of wedlock is 
increasingly considered unacceptable, and past years have witnessed the 
expansion of rights within the family.143 Herring has described contemporary 
legal culture as a “human rights era with an emphasis on private life”.144  
As the coercive impact of social roles imposed by the state has gradually 
diminished and more opportunities have emerged for authentic experiences of 
selfhood through increased individualization, a call for individually tailored 
legal solutions and new forms of conflict management emerged. Furthermore, 
the contemporary cultural diversity invoked the need for reasonable 
accommodation and value-neutral approaches to the regulation of the family, 
following the principle that “the laws of a multicultural, multi-faith society 
should be mandatory only to the extent that fundamental values are at 
stake.”145 Smart describes the processes of regulating and recognising 
relationships in family law as “a practice of kin making or ‘kinning’”, by which 
she means that “in various ways law operates to create recognised and 
recognisable forms of kinship. While once these practices of ‘kinning’ may 
have been largely imposed, in late modern times they are more likely to be 
attempts to keep abreast of changing social and cultural practices.”146   
Admittedly, the course of development has not been straightforward or 
without controversy, and surely we are far from the ideal of having completely 
abolished structures that reproduce diverse forms of inequalities. It is also true 
that the shift from prohibition to other forms of legal regulation has occurred 
alongside changing conceptions of state and statehood as the means of control 
developed towards facilitation and productive forms of governance.147 Yet 
most commentators agree that the liberalisation of family laws has generally 
decreased inequality and social stratification and increased the autonomy of 
individuals, and that more or less this has been the course of development in 
a number of countries around the globe.148 Following Honneth, I argue that 
this progress is largely due to the struggles for recognition, albeit those 
struggles are made structurally possible by various and sometimes contingent 
historical conditions, material and cultural. 
The established recognition relations enable the subjects to claim 
recognition for their individuality and authentic experiences; enforce the 
modern legal order’s idea of equality; assert claims based on the value of their 
contribution which has not been adequately recognised; and call attention to 
the needs or wishes that the institutional practice of intimate relationships has 
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failed to meet.149 A community of recognition relations, then, is a community 
of solidarity and shared responsibility, in which structural conditions beyond 
one’s own control, that shape one’s opportunities as well as one’s contributions 
in the sphere of esteem, are taken into account in the distribution of welfare as 
well in the sphere of private obligations. Within the liberal framework of family 
law, the feminist struggles over valuing care and child-bearing as a 
contribution to society offer examples of a struggle for recognition entailing 
claiming legal rights both in relation to the partner in the form of claims to 
fairer distribution of family assets and to society in the form of social rights. 
The basis of the legal claims lie in the structural aspects of women’s life (the 
gender-specific capacity to bear children) as well as in the claim for the value 
of their contribution to both the family and society. 
The legal recognition and regulation of family life and family relationships 
is undertaken not only by formal legal norms that directly define, for example, 
the legal concept of the family. Rather, the recognition of familyhood and 
kinship takes place at several sites and for various purposes; law includes 
various, and sometimes contradictory rationalities. Following a Foucauldian 
line of thought, van Walsum suggested that the discourses that serve to 
regulate status (alliance and descent) and discourses that serve to discipline 
by regulating behaviour (sexuality, moral obligations, quality of relationships 
and affect, quality of care, adequacy of meeting the needs in this sphere) 
“merge in the family, the site where state power has penetrated into the most 
intimate domains of modern life, producing a society in which the population 
is governed by the individual governing the self”.150 The point made by van 
Walsum is focal for analysing the regulation of family relationships, but this 
study takes the view that instead of the discourses of status and discipline, 
intimacy is regulated through the paradigm of status and the paradigm of 
relationality, which have both empowering and disciplinary potential. While 
the disciplinary potential in the former focuses on its outer limits, in the latter 
the disciplinary potential is located in the process of evaluating the quality and 
essence of the relationship.  
The regulatory potential of law can manifest as a normalising power, but 
the emergence of the paradigm of relationality151 in anthropology and 
sociology in the wake of the ‘new’ kinship studies indicates that law also seeks 
to recognise relationships and reflect social reality of kinship practices.152 The 
changes in statehood153 and modes of governing, such as the rise of rights, are 
obviously significant as to how and why the paradigm of relationality emerged. 
Nevertheless, relationality combines the significance of blood ties to “new 
kinship” practices where kin is formed around people “who occupy the same 
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place in emotional, cultural, locational and personal senses”,154 which is 
important as it makes the inclusion of for example families of choice 
possible.155 
The goal of establishing fairer terms of inclusion in the ethical relations of 
recognition demands different legal responses depending on the context. Two 
points are worth highlighting here. Firstly, affirmative legal recognition also 
means regulation – that something is brought under the rule and regulation of 
legal norms. Just recognition, in the sense of ethical relations, may at times 
mean being regulated and recognised by legal norms, while at other times such 
regulation may mark the exclusion of the individual, or maintain 
discriminatory structures that produce misrecognition for some individuals. 
From a specifically recognition theoretical position, Zurn has argued for a 
“derecognition of marriage”, as the notion of marriage is inherently restrictive 
regarding acceptable forms of family life, partnership, care, as well as sexual 
relations, and the normalising effect that marriage has in producing a 
particular heteronormative way of life as a cultural ideal.156 
Secondly, as was noted above, recognition spheres intertwine, which means 
that more than one principle of recognition usually applies at any one time. 
Furthermore, most elements of social life, such as a marriage, are complex and 
involve several aspects of social life. Marriage, for example, is a particularly 
complex social institution both socially and legally, and it “interacts across a 
multiplicity of social domains”.157 The relevance of this cultural, legal and 
social complexity regarding the norm of equality in family law is analysed in 
Article II and will be discussed below (3.2). Here, however, it is important to 
emphasise, again, that as there are not only one but several ‘legalities’ of 
marriage. This “legal complexity of a socially complex institution” can mean 
that the regulatory problem of (affirmative) legal recognition will remain even 
if the institution of marriage were to become derecognised or replaced with 
another regulatory concept seeking to recognise and regulate some aspects of 
intimacy and family life.158 Even if we did away with ‘marriage’, we would still 
need to recognise ‘family life’, ‘the household’ or ‘the family unit’ for various 
purposes; not to mention that the social institution of marriage would most 
likely still continue to figure in the day-to-day lives of ordinary folk. 
Recognition practices prevalent in law have both emancipatory and 
regulatory implications, but these implications do not affect everyone in the 
same way. The new, “liberal” forms of recognition bring about new forms of 
control and governance: family life becomes recognised and regulated for 
example through the (moral) discourses of gender equality and best interests 
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of the child. Grillo, for example, has argued that the moral order of the 
minority family is generally believed to be at odds with the one embodied by 
the ethnically European family.159 Studying the biopolitics of marriage in the 
Australian context, Cadwaller and Riggs note, similarly, that much of the 
anxiety over the Muslim population is channelled to the governance of family, 
marriage and reproduction.160 
While the emancipatory potential that these “soft” forms of regulation carry 
is obvious compared to previous, more coercive forms of regulation, new 
challenges arise following these changes in how families are governed.161 One 
of these challenges has to do with “normalisation”, which refers to the ways in 
which the “norm” is intertwined with biopolitics and disciplinary power. The 
“norm” privileges some ways of life and make them seem natural, liberal and 
desired by the individual, as being something he or she has chosen freely, thus 
producing normalised desire as individual and rational.162 At the same time 
this renders legitimate policies that, in the name of enhancing the wellbeing 
and life of the population, favour the normalised way of life. The risk is that 
some families and some ways of life become recognised and regulated only in 
the negative sense as problematic or suspect families.  
In the context of this study, a liberal framework of legal recognition is 
important, as it makes explicit the various conditions that have a bearing on 
the kind of subjects that are considered as belonging within the liberal regime 
of family law, as well as what kind of identities or relationships are 
marginalised in the process. One of these conditions concerns religion; 
religion is intertwined with the social institution of marriage and it plays a role 
in the recognition of individual and collective identities. The classical 
multiculturalist position is that the issue of family law and rights should not 
be framed merely as one about authority and enforcement, as such an 
approach is limited both regarding contemporary conceptualisations of rights 
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as well as the descriptive analysis of how people negotiate state law and 
religious family norms in their day-to-day life.  
3.1.2 RECOGNITION RELATIONS AND BELONGING IN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
In the classical view, private international law is perceived of as a procedural 
and technical body of conflict-of-laws rules, which addresses legal conflicts, 
statuses or processes that have connections to the jurisdiction of more than 
one state. It exists for the purpose of bridging the legal systems of two states 
by co-ordinating, through choice of law rules, competence rules and 
recognition rules, the individual legal question back to the level of material 
law.163 In other words, private international law functions as a means of 
allocating the case to the correct jurisdiction by determining the right forum 
and identifying the law applicable to the case. Furthermore, recognition rules 
guarantee that decisions, judgements and statuses are also recognised beyond 
the jurisdictions in which they were formed. In Corneloup’s words, private 
international law “provides co-ordination methods in order to resolve 
conflicting legal pluralism. It does not aim to harmonize substantial rules but 
to co-ordinate legal diversity on an international level”.164  
The classical view, which distinguishes between procedural norms of 
private international law and norms of substantial law, has been called the 
neutrality approach. While it is often pointed out that this neutrality has its 
limits,165 it still underpins the doctrines and analyses of the field. The principle 
of neutrality stands for two things. Firstly, it requires that a clear and rigid 
boundary is erected and maintained between law and non-law. ‘Law’, even 
when understood as including for example customary law, legal concepts and 
principles or doctrines of interpretation, is strictly speaking state law.166 It was 
noted above that family life is governed through two discourses, the discourse 
of status and the discourse of relationship. In inscribing a rigid boundary 
between law and non-law, the classical understanding of private international 
law prioritises the discourse of status, as status is constituted by legal rules 
rather than social facts, such as relational reality. Secondly, private 
international law does not address the justifications or legitimacy of foreign 
(or municipal) legal norms. Exceptions to this main principle exist but are 
limited to the narrow interpretation and application of the ordre public 
doctrine, which rejects the recognition of norms that would lead to outcomes 
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that might jeopardize the fundamentals of lex fori.167 These two aspects, 
central to the principle of neutrality, also define the concepts of ‘society’ and 
‘border’ that underpin legal thought in the field, prescribing a state-centralist 
understanding of law, society and nation-state.168  
Through the identification of state with society, the nation-state  came to 
represent the community of cultural and moral order – the recognition 
relations historically established in a society – to which an individual or a legal 
relation was perceived as belonging to.169 The starting point in private 
international law, generally speaking, is that for each legal relation (including 
status such as marriage or divorce; conflicts such as dispute over custody; or 
instruments such as a provision about Islamic mahr in a marriage contract), a 
“home” can be determined. Usually this is done through defining the relevant 
connections. i.e. those legally relevant facts that link the legal issue in question 
to the legal order of a particular state. Connections are determined in each 
country’s conflict of laws rules and include, for example, the law of nationality 
(lex patriae), or the law of the country where the person is habitually resident 
(lex domicilii). 
Consistent with the thought that society and nation-state are one and the 
same, issues having societal significance, including those central to personal 
identity, such as marriage, were linked to the personal law of the individual, 
which by definition was the law of nationality or domicile.170 According to 
Shakargy:  
The consistent application of national (or domiciliary) law to 
marital issues reflects an assumption regarding the special 
importance of these matters: it implies that the connection 
between person and a legal ‘home’ is real and substantial to the 
extent that it justifies the states’ interest in, and indeed 
involvement, in that person’s relationships.171 
 
The classical view depicted private international law as part of a system 
based on national legal orders, which were divided into systematically 
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organized branches of law, in which the purpose of international law, both 
public and private, was to regulate relations between states and their legal 
orders.172 Neutrality was not only desirable because of this system based on 
equal nation-states and their national legal systems, but indeed possible only 
within such a system. However, recent trends and processes of materialisation 
and harmonisation have challenged the classical view of private international 
law.173 These trends are in part a manifestation of the ongoing proceses of 
transnationalisation of law, and they also mark a fracture as to how the 
concepts of “border” and society are constructed in private international 
law.174     
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner highlight the polycentric forms of 
globalisation processes, which lead to the fragmentation of global law. This 
fragmentation, according to authors, “has its origin in contradictions between 
society-wide institutionalized rationalities, which law cannot solve, but which 
demand a legal legal approach to colliding norms”.175 As part of this normative 
reorientation, they argue that the idea of systemic unity is to be abandoned as 
outdated and instead the focus should be on the emerging decentralised modes 
of coping with conflicts. Materialisation of private international law is thus 
part of globalisation; as different sectoral regimes lead to different principles 
of conflicts law, a reorientation from collision norms to substantive rules takes 
place.176 At the same time, however, materialisation in the form of recourse to 
fundamental norms and values may assume ideological character and emerge 
as an attempt to promote specific political goals, as Sportel has recently 
demonstrated.177  
In contemporary international family law habitual residence as a 
connecting factor has gained ground as a key connection and largely replaced 
connection doctrines based on nationality, especially in European family 
law.178 According to Article 3(1a) of the Brussels II bis Regulation 
(2201/2003), for example, the jurisdiction in divorce matters falls to the court 
in whose territory the spouses are habitually resident; or were last habitually 
resident, insofar as one of them still resides there; or the respondent is 
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habitually resident, or in the event of a joint application, either of the spouses 
is habitually resident, or the applicant is habitually resident if he or she resided 
there for at least a year immediately prior to the application. The regulation 
applies even to cases where one of the spouses has never resided within the 
territory of the EU. The concept of habitual residence can not be exclusively 
defined, but the idea is that habitual residence is in the country in which the 
centre of the person’s social life is: the place to which he or she has most 
attachment, where he or she mostly lives, and where the person’s most 
important social ties such as family and friends are.179 The elements that 
constitute habitual residence are interpreted in the praxis of both national 
courts and the EU Court of Justice. Importantly, this interpretation is closely 
connected to the goals of the legal norms in question.180  Evaluation of habitual 
resindence is evaluation of ‘belonging’ of the individual, and connected to the 
goals of legal norms, this evalution includes a political element. 
Karjalainen speaks of the recent practical turn regarding legal norms on 
connections, especially in international family law; instead of relating to the 
choice of law, connections these days mostly relate to identifying the 
competent authority.181 The increasing mobility across national borders 
rendered personal statute theory impractical, and slowly a shift took place 
towards the principle of closest connection.182 Connections define the 
relationship of belonging between the individual (or the legal relationship 
attached to that individual) and the jurisdiction, understood here as 
embodying the system of recognition relations.183  In addition to the practical 
purposes of allocating the case to the correct jurisdiction, connections serve 
the purpose of defining the scope and relevance of ordre public consideration. 
Connections, thus, define the place of the ‘border’ in terms of jurisdiction in 
two senses: first, as a question of competences and applicable law, and second, 
as boundaries of acceptability. The scope of ordre public consideration is 
determined in relation to the recognition relations considered fundamental to 
the issue in question.184 A brief examination of the interrelationship between 
connections, recognition rules and ordre public in the contexts of marriage 
will serve to illustrate the point. 
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184 Isailovic has analysed private international law from a recognition theoretical 
perspective, which is quite different than the one adopted in this study. She uses recognition 
theory to examine how private international law may provide for the recognition of ‘otherness’. 
Ivana Isailovic. ’Political Recognition and Transnational Law: Gender Equality and Cultural 
Diversification in French Courts,’ in Horatia Muir Watt and Diego P. Fernández Arroyo (eds.) 




The first example concerns the right to marry. The question as to whether 
a person has the right to marry before a Finnish authority is about the rules 
defining the applicable law to the statutory impediments to marriage. 
According to Section 108 of the Finnish Marriage Act, if neither of the intended 
spouses is a Finnish citizen and if neither is habitually resident in Finland, they 
have the right to marry before a Finnish authority only if the marriage is 
permissible, firstly, under the law of Finland, and secondly, if each of them has 
the right to marry according either to the law of the state whose citizen he or 
she is or where he or she is habitually resident. The intended spouses are 
required to present a credible account of their right to marry under the 
applicable foreign law, but if such information is not available, owing to a state 
of war or other comparable unstable conditions prevailing in that state, the 
right to marry may be examined under Finnish law, given that the intended 
spouses have relevant connections to Finland.185 Connections are in this 
context understood as social links to Finland, material facts such as intentions 
to live or work in Finland, Finnish nationality or family relations in Finland. 
If foreign law is applied to the right to marry and its provisions regarding 
the right to marry go against ordre public, such provisions can be rejected. The 
discretion concerning the ordre public principle, however, is defined again 
with a reference to belonging: the connections of the marriage define whether 
it is practical to reject the requirements of foreign law.  
As an example, Helin mentions Malaysian law, according to which 
religious affiliation may form an impediment to marry to people 
who come from different religious backgrounds. Such an 
impediment would clearly be in breach of the fundamental values 
of several European legal orders, Finland included. However, if 
the intended spouses have littel or no connections to Finland and 
for example plan to live in a state that will not recognise their 
marriage if it was concluded against an impediment, which in that 
legal system might be important, rejecting the foreign norm on 
the grounds of ordre public makes little sense.186  
Belonging of the individual to society, and to the established ethical 
relations of that society (i.e. recognition relations as values considered 
fundamental in society), is defined by the extent to which the matter at hand 
has to do with identity and personhood of the parties. Thus the scope of private 
autonomy regarding whether the parties may contractually arrange which law 
applies to their relationship is generally speaking broader in matters of 
economic consequences of marriage than in matters regarding the personal 
consequences of marriage.187 Similarly, while the Rome III Regulation188 
allows spouses autonomy in choosing the applicable law to divorce, Finland 
and Sweden chose to remain outside the Regulation because they considered 
                                                 
185 Markku Helin, Suomen kansainvälinen perhe- ja perintöoikeus. Helsinki: Talentum, 
2013. Helin notes that due to the increase in so-called marriage tourism, cases have emerged 
where the spouses have no intention to ever live in a country, despite concluding their 
marriage in that country. In these cases it would create problems if the marriage would only 
be valid according to the rules of the country where the conclusion of the marriage took place. 
186 Helin 2013, 162. 
187 Helin 2013, 220. 
188 Council Regulation (EU) No 1259/2010 of 20 December 2010, implementing enhanced 
co-operation in the area of the law applicable to divorce and legal separation. 
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certain rights regarding divorce so fundamental that providing scope for 
private autonomy concerning these rights could not be tolerated.189 
The recognition of marriages serves as another illustrative example of the 
relationship between ordre public and connections, i.e. belonging and 
recognition relations. Despite remaining unratified in most countries, in many 
of them the Hague Marriage Convention190 nevertheless modelled national 
norms on the recognition of marriages in Finland.191 Following this 
convention, in Finland too the issue of recognition of foreign marriages is 
governed by recognition norms, not choice of law rules.192 According to 
Finnish law, a marriage concluded by a woman and a man in a foreign state 
before an authority of that state shall be valid in Finland, if it is valid in the 
state where it was concluded or in a state whose citizen either spouse was or 
where either spouse was habitually resident at the conclusion of the marriage. 
The general rule thus follows the internationally widely accepted principle that 
the formal validity of a marriage is governed by the law of the country where 
the marriage was celebrated (lex loci celebrationis). English law, for example, 
deems marriages by proxy valid solely on the grounds of lex loci 
celebrationis.193 Perceptions about belonging are inherent in recognition 
norms. 
Often the lexi loci celebrationis norm is completed by additive criteria, 
which determine whether the marriage is acceptable in the sense that it can be 
recognised. Finnish law, for example, sets special conditions for the 
recognition of a marriage that has been concluded in a foreign state after the 
death of one of the intended spouses, or without one of the intended spouses 
being present in person at the conclusion of the marriage, or that has been 
concluded merely informally, without a ceremony or other formality.194 The 
requirement is that the marriage is, firstly, valid according to the lex loci 
celebrationis, and secondly, when there is a special reason why the marriage 
                                                 
189 Rome III Regulation has invoked interesting questions about the required standard of 
institutional ‘legality’ of foreign divorces. In the Sahyoni case currently pending before CJEU 
(C-372/16) the Court is called to decide whether a "private" divorce (i.e. a divorce in which the 
role of a foreign court or other official authority has not been constitutive but merely 
declarative), in this case a divorce by repudiation, falls within the scope of application of the 
Rome III Regulation. Attorney General is of the view that the Regulation does not apply to the 
case. However, should Rome III apply, the Court would have to decide whether the divorce 
should be left unrecognised following Article 10 of the Regulation, which holds that men and 
women should be placed in equal position with respect to divorce. On the same issue in the 
municipal private international law, see for example Sportel 2017 and Kruiger. Pauline 
Kruiger. Islamic Divorces in Europe: Bridging the Gap between European and Islamic Legal 
Orders. Den Haag: Eleven International Publishing, 2015.  
190 Convention signed on 14 March 1978 in The Hague on Celebration and Recognition of 
the Validity of Marriages. 
191 Helin 2013, 169. 
192 Ibid. 
193 See the case of Awuku v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] EWCA 
Civ 178 (23 March 2017). The case is important as it marked a precedent in relation to previous 
case law (mainly the Kareem case from 2014). 
194 These stem from the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage 
and Registration of Marriages 1962. According to Article 1 of the Convention, no marriage 
shall be legally entered into without the full and free consent of both parties, such consent to 
be expressed by them in person after due publicity and in the presence of the authority 
competent to solemnize the marriage and of witnesses, as prescribed by law. 
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should be deemed valid in Finland. In the discretion, special attention is again 
given to the ties manifesting the belonging of the person to the foreign 
jurisdiction as well as to the duration of the cohabitation of the spouses. 195 
Furthermore, according to the ordre public principle, marriage can be rejected 
if recognising it would violate the fundamental values of the Finnish legal 
order. 
Recognition of marriages also serves as a prime example of how the general 
trend of materialisation of private international law changes the way belonging 
is understood. Sweden, for example, amended the norms on the recognition of 
foreign marriages in 2004, and is currently in the process of evaluating how 
these norms function.196 The primary goal of the amendment was to enhance 
the protection of vulnerable individuals – mainly immigrant girls – against 
forced or early marriages.197 After the amendment, a marriage concluded 
abroad is not recognised if the person had been forced to marry, unless special 
reasons could be identified to support recognition. The travaux préparatoires 
to the amendment state that if the jurisdiction in question does not provide 
both spouses with the right to decide over the marriage, the duress should be 
considered serious if the marriage was established against the person’s will.198 
As for the ordre public reservation, the travaux préparatoires take the view 
that a situation where the reservation may be applied might be at hand, for 
example, when a person has entered into marriage at a very young age or has 
been forced to marry. Studying the criminalisation of forced marriages in 
Dutch, English and international criminal law, Haenen notes that according to 
the Dutch private international law, withholding the recognition of a forced or 
child marriage will be determined in each case.199 In general, the European 
consensus seems to be developing towards non-recognition of forced and child 
marriages; they should only be recognised if such recognition is in the interests 
of the victim.200  
The criteria restricting the recognisability of ‘unacceptable’ marriages 
reflects changes in how belonging and recognition relations are understood in 
the field; instead of the self-evident reference point to a nation-state and its 
legal system as the recognition order, individuals are considered as belonging 
to global recognition order established by rights.201 In Fischer-Lescano and 
                                                 
195 Helin 2013, 174-175; HE 44/2001 51. 
196 The Government has given Justice of the Supreme Court Mari Heidenborg the task of 
reviewing how protection against child marriage, forced marriage and ‘honour’ crimes can be 
strengthened. The part of the remit concerning the recognition of child marriages contracted 
abroad is to be presented in an interim report by 6 December 2017. The final report is to be 
submitted by 1 September 2018. 
197 Göran Lambertz. ’Child marriages and the law – with special reference to Swedish 
developments,’ in Maarit Jänterä-Jareborg (ed.) The Child’s Interests in Conflict: The 
Intersections Between Society, Family, Faith and Culture Cambridge: Intersentia, 85. 
198 Regeringens Prop2003/04:48, 56. 
199 Iris Haenen. Force & Marriage: The criminalisation of forced marriages in Dutch, 
English and European criminal law. Cambridge: Intersentia, 2014. 
200 Assembly of the European Council Resolution 1468 (2005); In Finland, however, Helin 
has suggested that the conceptual framework of contract law should be used for defining the 
concept of ‘ilegal coercion’, i.e. for defining when coercion has been severe to the extent that 
the marriage should be considered non-existent. Helin 2013 178, footnote 98. 
201 Sportel, however, has identified a form of ’sexual nationalism’ in the connection 
between the ‘weak’ position of women and ordre public. According to her, ”the concept of 
public policy is strongly influenced by a discourse on sexual nationalism, where gender 
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Teubner’s theoretical framework of globalisation and conflicts law, the conflict 
here has to do with the conflicting rationalities and policies of the regulatory 
regime of private international law in the traditional sense, defined by 
neutrality, and the regulatory regime of rights.202 However, as the victim-
centred argumentation demonstrates, instead of referring to fixed and 
hierarchical solutions, law is increasingly seeking to concern itself with the 
underlying social conflicts themselves.203 
3.1.3 RECOGNITION RELATIONS IN MIGRATION LAW: A “FEUDAL” 
SYSTEM OF STATUS-DIFFERENTIATION 
 
In the earlier “feudal” system204 of legal equality attached to status 
differentiation, which preceded the modern legal system based on universal 
legal equality, the scope of rights depended on status: the legal equality was 
intertwined with social worth, social role or class. While this status 
differentiation was largely abolished in modern law, including family law and 
private international law, it clearly prevails as the foundations of legal 
relations in migration law. The legal regime of migration law is one based on 
the goal and purpose of maintaining the foundational border of the population 
and of the state, which often finds expression in the rule that the foundational 
sovereignty of the state mandates it to define the borders of its community. 
This starting point is unconditionally legitimated, for example, within the 
framework of the European Convention on Human Rights.205  
In migration law, the “feudal” system of status is built on the two 
foundational classes of citizens and non-citizens. It is hardly the case that non-
citizens would be granted no rights at all; most of the states respect the rights 
of the residents to form relationships with foreigners and adhere to some form 
of territorial principle, i.e. territorial presence in the state grants a person 
some rights.206 Nevertheless, it is widely accepted that states may treat citizens 
and non-citizens differently and categories, restrictions and privileges 
provided in migration law are usually based on this foundational status 
differentiation. Even advocates of extensive state obligations based on the 
principle of ethical territoriality usually accept the basic distinction between 
the citizen and the non-citizen.207 In addition to the “feudal” differentiation 
                                                 
equality and sexual diversity are of great symbolic importance for Dutch national identity”. 
Sportel 2017, 61 and 66. 
202 Furthermore, these regulatory regimes are auto-constitutional and refer to different 
constitutional rules and principles. Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, 1015. 
203 Ibid. 1021 and 1024. 
204 The term “feudal” is used here to highlight the fundamental differences between a 
system, which bases legal equality on equality within status groups and a system, which bases 
legal equality on everyone’s equal citizenship status. The term does not refer here to 
‘feudalism’. 
205 Dembour 2015. 
206 Betty de Hart. 2009. ‘Love thy neighbour: family reunification and the rights of 
insiders,’ European Journal of Migration and Law 11:3, 235-252, 236; Joseph Carens 2003. 
‘Who should get in? The ethics of immigration admissions,’ Ethics & International Affairs 17, 
96. 
207 Hamsa M. Murthy. ‘Sovereignty and Its Alternatives: On the Terms of (Illegal) Alienage 
in U.S. Law,’ in Austin Sarat (ed.) Special Issue: Who Belongs? Immigration, Citizenship, and 
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between classes of citizens and non-citizens, the process of subjectivation in 
migration law, which rests on the foundational pair of subjectivities, the 
“citizen” and the “alien”, enables the differentiation not only between but also 
within formally equal status groups. “Territorialism” seeks to produce the 
subjectivity of the “citizen” within the class of non-citizen, but several 
mechanisms are also at play when the subjectivity of the “alien” is produced in 
the class of citizen.208  Family relationships, as de Hart observes, may lead to 
the inclusion of non-citizens but also to the exclusion of citizens.209 
The justification behind the state’s right to restrict migration derives from 
the state’s interest in protecting public order and security, which, according to 
the contemporary doctrine, may include both economic interests and 
integration goals. The status of the sponsor (i.e. the person residing in the state 
in which the family wishes to settle and whom a family member lacking legal 
residence status wishes to join) is often decisive in family migration as it 
determines the scope of rights and conditions of family migration. For 
example, the citizenship of the sponsor may be the condition for family 
reunification, in which case only family members of citizens of the country are 
eligible for family reunification. More often, however, citizenship status or the 
status of residency (for example whether one has gained a permanent 
residence permit based on refugee status, asylum, or family relation) 
determines which conditions apply to family reunification. When the right to 
family reunification is granted for third-country nationals, as for example in 
the Family Reunification Directive (2003/86/EC), the restrictive provisions 
concerning the required level of income are the most effective means of 
controlling and limiting family migration into most EU countries. In addition, 
the Directive allows for the possibility of introducing integration requirements 
to family members.210 I argue that due to the fact that there are few limitations 
as to how high the expectation of income requirement can be set, the right of 
the state to restrict migration is, de facto, the starting point in EU law too, even 
though it formally provides the right to family reunification (which 
                                                 
the Constitution of Legality (Studies in Law, Politics and Society, Volume 60), 1-27. Bingley: 
Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2013. 
208 The process is further complicated by the issue of so-called “reverse discrimination”, 
which refers to the situation in which a citizen living in his or her own country, subjected to 
national rules, is disadvantaged compared to a person who has exercised their mobility rights 
under EU law and thus become subject to the EU rules (see, for example, Staver 2013; de Hart 
2007, 153). While this issue is not the main concern here, it is worth noting that the 
fragmentation of the rules and categories in European migration law demonstrates the 
increasing complexity of transnational law. See also Costello, who questions rigid binary 
between ‘legal’ and ‘illegal’ migration. Cathryn Costello. The Human Rights of Migrants and 
Refugees in European Law. Oxford: Oxfrod University Press, 2016. 
209 De Hart. Unlikely couples, 59. 
210 See Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 September 2003 on the right to family 
reunification, Article 7, which states that the state may require that: 1. evidence is presented 
that the sponsor has: a) accommodation regarded as normal for a comparable family; b) 
sickness insurance; and c) stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain 
himself/herself and the members of his/her family, without recourse to the social assistance 
system; and 2. that third country nationals comply with integration measures, in accordance 
with national law. 
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international law, including the ECHR, does not).211 The income requirement 
in the context of EU law will be examined in more detail in section 3.4. 
The restrictions are often framed either as necessary from the perspective 
of maintaining or promoting social cohesion or as economic necessities. 
Economic conditions for family migration in different forms of income 
requirements are the key technique for controlling and restricting family 
migration in contemporary European societies. In this study, the income 
requirements in the Nordic countries, particularly in the context of marriage 
migration, were examined and it was argued that these are set at such a high 
level that the costs make family migration virtually impossible for a large 
number of families, especially in the low income groups to which many 
migrants belong.212 This also means that the restriction easily becomes the 
essence of the norm, which, in fact, has been explicitly noted for example by 
the Finnish Supreme Court in cases that concerned claims for exemptions to 
the income requirements.213   
In the 1985 case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United 
Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights accepted that it was not 
contrary to the Convention to give “special treatment to those whose links with 
a country stem from birth within it”,214 as long the results of this treatment 
were proportional. As de Hart points out, in the 1985 case, the Court “accepted 
an implicit standard of ethnicity, which played an important role in later case 
law”.215 The ruling in Biao, it was argued in Article III, opened a space for a 
struggle for equal recognition and respect between citizens, although this 
potential was eventually not used by the Court. Article III argued, furthermore, 
that the distinctions between “new nationals” and “nationals-by-birth”,216 
accompanied by restrictive integration requirements, are underpinned by a 
coercive and disciplinary notion of integration, which Kostakopoulou has 
called the “thick concept of political belonging”. According to her, the concept 
                                                 
211 CJEU has in its case law sought to place some limitations as to how the income 
requirement can be used in national laws of Member States. The applications must, for 
example, be investigated on individual basis, and the required amount of stable and regular 
resources which are sufficient to maintain the family must be set at the level of the standard 
of ”social assistance”. See for example: Chakroun C 578/08, 4 March 2010; and Khachab, C-
558/14, 21 April 2016.  
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Staver 2014 and Pellander 2016. 
213 See, for example: KHO:2013:97. 
214 European Court of Human Rights, the case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the 
United Kingdom, 28 May 1985, para 88. 
215 De Hart 2009, 239. 
216 It is worth noting here that serious doubts have been raised as to whether the objectives 
of treating “new nationals” differently from “nationals-by-birth” can convincingly be argued 
to have an objective and reasonable justification in the context of family migration. For 
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such as the required age of 24 for spousal migration, which it noted is disproportionate to the 
aim sought and has a discriminatory effect on minority groups. Moreover, the restrictive 
amendments of 2011 to family reunification rules, which require proof of integration as a 
condition of family reunification (such as proof of effort to integrate and success in an A1 level 
language course), were noted with concern by ECRI. See ECRI, fourth report on Denmark 
(ECRI (2012) 25), paragraphs 124-126, 129. 
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of integration functions as a disciplinary mechanism and a process of 
certification for those persons deemed not morally qualified as full members 
of community and worthy of citizenship.217 As opposed to the classic paradigm 
of social democratic welfare, which views integration as something that stems 
from the desire for social equality and investment in people, this paradigm of 
integration seeks to distinguish between different classes of citizens, and 
discipline those individuals who are considered in some way deviant.218 
Characteristic of a “feudal” legal system based on status differentiation was 
that the recognition spheres of esteem (honour, dignity, achievement) and 
respect (legal equality) were not deemed distinguishable. The same 
observation can be made about legal equality in migration law: universal legal 
equality of individuals is not the starting point, but rather follows from 
recognition principles derived in complex ways from the recognition 
principles in the spheres of esteem and love. According to Cox, legal 
immigration categories reflect the tripartite recognition order of modern 
societies. Despite the differences in details and standards of migration laws 
between countries, general categories of family migration, labour migration 
with privileges for highly skilled migrants and humanitarian migration can be 
found in most jurisdictions.219 As Cox notes, distinctions within the different 
categories (as well as between them) reflect spheres of recognition: it is much 
easier for a highly-skilled migrant to bring his or her family into the host state, 
as he or she is considered to make a valuable contribution to the host society. 
Likewise, the family relationships considered eligible in family migration 
reflect the recognition relations of the sphere of love and intimate 
relationships embodied in the institution of the nuclear family, prioritizing 
spousal relations and minor dependants.  
Legitimising the high standard of income requirements, the discourse of 
economic security, aligned with ideas of non-belonging, replaces the principle 
of solidarity with the norm of private responsibility. The high costs of family 
migration are visited on the individual, and the individual alone. Pellander 
refers to this selection of migrants on economic grounds as “economic 
gatekeeping”,220 whereas in this study the economic processes and goals of 
gatekeeping are perceived as moral struggles within the “feudal” system of 
distinct spheres of recognition. Instead of being integrated with the struggles 
in other recognition spheres, the boundary between what is considered public 
vs. individual responsibility is drawn primarily within the sphere of 
achievement. 
Having spelt out the different foundations of the three legal fields in the 
focus of this study, as well as their reference points to recognition relations, it 
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is now time to proceed to the analysis provided in the articles concerning the 
techniques through which their intersections and tensions are governed. 
3.2 INTERSECTING LEGALITIES: GOVERNING 
FAMILIES THROUGH ACCESS AND CONTROL 
This section focuses on how intersectionality of subject positions both direct 
the regulative impact of law as well as affect recognition and access to the ‘law’ 
in its different forms. Drawing on the notion of governmentality,221 the section 
investigates how both the individual and the population are being governed 
through the discourses of status and relationship, and what disciplinary and 
emancipatory effects are attached to the techniques of government. The 
analysis in this section is mainly based on Articles I and II. 
Article I examines the conclusion, registration and legality of marriage 
amongst Finnish Muslims from three related angles: mosque discourses on 
and role in marriage conclusion; practices of selected individual Muslims; and 
the policies and work of state institutions that are concerned with registration 
and validity of marriages. While the main focus of the article is in the legality 
of Muslim marriages, rather than cross-border or transnational family 
relationships, transnationality in the context of the article results from the fact 
that most Muslims residing in Finland today either have migrated to Finland 
themselves or belong to the second generation, i.e. their parents have migrant 
histories. They have transnational family connections more often than average, 
or their status as migrants may limit their possibilities to access legal 
institutions such as marriage. Furthermore, marriage as an institution is often 
a site where transnational processes of kinship are manifested222 and 
observations about the marriage patterns among Muslim migrants suggest 
that they often marry transnationally.223  
Our findings in Article I indicate that religious legality and state legality 
intersect in multiple ways, and that these intersections are shaped, in turn, by 
other positionalities, such as those that have to do with identity documents, 
residence status and transnational family relationships. Firstly, all our 
interlocutors referred to situations where couples face difficulties in obtaining 
the required documents for registering marriages either because their home 
countries lack the institutional structures that would facilitate this process 
(e.g. Afghanistan because of the war and multiple movements of Afghani 
refugees) or because these individuals lack legal residence status in Finland, 
which makes it harder for them to access state institutions. In these cases, 
                                                 
221 Michel Foucault. ’Governmentality,’ in Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, Peter Miller, 
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religious marriages are sometimes the only form of marriages available for 
these people. The mosques thus served individuals who were intersectionally 
most disadvantaged and secured not only their right to marry but provided 
them with intimate and religious citizenship that they otherwise would have 
been effectually excluded from. Intimate citizenship, which includes the 
freedom and ability to live selfhood in a wide range of close relationships with 
respect and recognition form state and community, is shaped by the laws, 
policies and cultures that prescribe and regulate intimate life, in ways that are 
impacted by other hierarchies and social norms.224 Religious and intimate 
citizenships proved intertwined in this respect. 
Problems relating to availability and reliability of foreign documents on 
personal identity and relationship status were evident also in the document 
material of the study. We noted in the article that the ‘legality’ of marriage is 
related to other systems within which and through which the individual 
becomes ‘legally’ recognisable. In this process, the role of the publicly reliable 
register system and its operations of verification of personal identity and 
relationships is crucial. Marriage as a question of legally recognised status is 
connected to the existence of individuals through statuses. Foucault’s notion 
of governmentality is essentially about the ways in which governance is made 
to reach each and all, both the individual and the population.225 The register 
system serves to connect the individual to the population; it designates each 
and everyone one, and only one, calculable and verifiable place in the register, 
and thus in the population. The verification is necessary in order to secure that 
the knowledge of the individual is adequately inserted into the system. 
However, the goal of absolute completeness of the register system is difficult 
to achieve, and depending on the country to which the individual has ties, 
obtaining the necessary foreign documents can be either easy and relatively 
inexpensive, or difficult, dangerous and costly, or even practically impossible. 
Another example of how state legality and religious legality are 
interconnected emerged in the interviews with imams and other people 
affiliated with mosques. While they did not consider religious-only marriages 
as religiously invalid, they did articulate a hierarchy of Islamic marriages, in 
which marriages that meet the state’s requirement of registration where 
favoured in comparison to religious-only marriages. Some mosques did not 
conclude religious-only marriages at all, or they concluded religious marriages 
only after the couple had presented a state certificate verifying that they have 
no legal impediments for marriage. In our analysis, we suggested that these 
attitudes to the legality of marriage reflect governmentality as a form of power 
where the desired modified behavior is produced by self-governance instead 
of repressive forms of state power.226 Another important finding had to do with 
the mutual constitutiveness of religious and state legality and, accordingly, 
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religious authority of the mosque. However, again mosques turned out to be 
differently able to access a productive and authority-increasing power 
relationship vis-a-vis the state, depending on the particular socio-economic 
profile of the people they cater to. 
However, while it clearly is a disadvantage caused by intersectional 
positionality that some people lack the access to marriage or cannot have their 
marital status or other family relationships legally recognised, not everyone 
desires to have their marriage recognised by the state. In line with previous 
research,227 our interviews with individuals indicate that opting for a nikah, a 
religious-only marriage, can signal agency. It can, for example, serve as a form 
of halal relationship or “engagement” before the couple are officially legally 
married. Choices about marriage conclusion are made primarily on the basis 
of the needs and priorities of individuals at the time of the marriage. 
The possibility to opt for a religious-only marriage may enhance agency and 
provide scope for choices and autonomy. Due to the various purposes that 
recognising and regulating relationships may serve, however, the issue of the 
legality of religious marriages emerged also when we looked at different ways 
in which the marital status of the individual became defined as problem in 
state legal discourses. The analysed paternity cases demonstrate that the pater 
est -assumption continues to be a powerful legal mechanism of “kin-
making”.228 Furthermore, the impact of the assumption seems to be 
particularly pervasive in the context of transnational family relationships. This 
points to the fact that the merging of the discourses of relationship and status 
direct state legal control on transnational families in specific ways.  
In the discourse of relationship, disciplinary power embedded in the legal 
recognition of relationships emerges as a question of the acceptability and 
quality of the relationship. In article I, we noted that, contrary to some other 
European countries, religious-only marriages or divorces have not been 
framed as a public concern or debated in Finnish media or politics. Such public 
concern might, however, be emerging. In the liberal discourse of freedom of 
choice and rights to privacy, the regulative pressure is often articulated in 
terms of women’s human rights.  
In Article II, human rights discourse dwelling on culture, religion and 
family law and claims made to universality within these debates were were 
analysed in the framework of the CEDAW convention. Article II argues that 
by effectively promoting the non-recognition of religious family norms, the 
CEDAW Committee risks presenting gender equality as inherently linked to 
secularism. The paradigm of secularism is connected not only to the 
institutional design or ideas about what counts as law or legally relevant but 
carries implications also to the theorizing of both gender and religion.229 
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Feminist legal analyses have sometimes failed to fully understand the 
significance of feminist theologies, which seek to contest religious patriarchies 
by active participation and reinterpretation of the tradition.230 This can take 
place either within religious scholarship or by individuals. For instance, 
writing about Muslim couples in Finland, Al-Sharmani traces mixed 
approaches to the issue of marriage between state and religious institutions.231 
Arguing for a multidimensional understanding of religious transformations of 
Muslim immigrants in Europe, she highlights the ways in which “these 
transformations are also part of an internal process of modern Muslims 
engaging with their discursive religious tradition with the aim of 
reinterpreting and reclaiming the core Islamic values that would guide their 
daily lives.” The renegotiations of cultural and religious norms have offered 
women means to resist practices they experience as harmful, such as 
polygynous marriages, which first wives often find offending.232  
Two examples of financial consequences of marriage are examined in 
Article II, that of the distribution of matrimonial assets in Finland and that of 
the mahr provisions and their legal recognition. Even though these examples 
are very different they suggest the importance of understanding law in context 
and law in every day practices. In the Finnish case,  it is highlighted that there 
are various procedural thresholds as to whether couples can actually access 
the law in case of dispute. In the case of mahr, the point is made that it is the 
varied ways in which mahr is part of marriage practices and the diverse ways 
in which it is used by women that constitute its real and layered meanings, not 
the reductionist notion that it objectifies women. As Bano notes, Muslim 
engagement with sharia in matters of family law is a complex process that 
cannot be understood in simple oppositional terms (e.g. sharia v. state law, 
Muslim v. non-Muslims, or insiders of communities v. outsiders), or through 
rethinking legal rights and obligations in order to better accommodate 
religious family law. Instead she emphasised the urgency of understanding 
the specific ways in which religious norms and legal orders emerge in the local 
context.233 Cowan, Dembour and Wilson too point out that  no “single model 
of the relationship between culture and rights, or between minority and 
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majority rights, is going to be adequate for all cases, either normatively or 
analytically”.234 
Focusing on the tension between inserting a regulatory rule of equality and 
yet staying sensitive to the variety of experiences, Article II examines the 
epistemic problems attached to the concept of equality. Following Fredman, 
it argues that the concept of equality underpinning CEDAW should be 
understood as substantive and multidimensional. It thus prescribes an 
intersectional approach to equality, which refuses to view equality merely as 
an institutional norm. This concept of substantive equality is four-
dimensional: Firstly, in its redistributive dimension, substantive equality 
aims to remedy disadvantage through redressing it. Secondly, in the 
recognition dimension, substantive equality seeks to address social stigmas 
and stereotypes and to promote respect and dignity. As Fredman notes, the 
recognition dimension of equality ensures that equality may not be fulfilled by 
treating everyone equally badly.235 Recognition alone, however, is not 
sufficient, as it may lead to displacement of distributive policies and 
reification of static group identities.236 The third dimension of substantive 
equality is the transformative dimension, which seeks to change the 
underlying cultural codes normalising discriminative practices and traditions. 
The fourth dimension stresses the importance participation, i.e. that those 
affected by the policies can have their voices heard.237 Hence, substantive 
equality requires that the diversity in women’s voices be taken into account. 
The point made in Article II is that gender equality should be approached 
within frameworks that, in dynamic and interconnected ways, ground the 
question of gender equality and social justice in multiple systems of meanings 
and norms, such as religious traditions, state law, international human rights 
and most of all the lived realities of people. In other words, equality should be 
universal on the one hand, but also culturally meaningful on the other hand. 
The notion of substantive equality underlying CEDAW also suggests that it it 
is possible to adopt a nuanced approach that recognises the linkages between 
the private and the public and the importance of the contexts where hindering 
or enabling factors to equality take shape.  
3.3 INTERSECTING LEGAL FIELDS: TECHNIQUES OF 
GOVERNING REGIME COLLISIONS 
It was noted earlier that the regulation and recognition of family life in law is 
based on two mutually constitutive, yet distinct, discourses: the discourse of 
status and the discourse of relationship. The fact that one may always choose 
to refer to either one was argued to cause indeterminacy, as two opposite 
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outcomes can be argued for with equal validity, depending on whether 
reference is made to the discourse on status or the discourse of relationship. 
This section focuses on means of controlling or governing the tension created 
by the intersection of two legal fields, private international law and migration 
law. Both discourses enable manoeuvres that allow for the “stronger” regime 
to prevail and force the other to adjust to its goals.  
When the decision is made within the discourse of relationship, the 
technique of manipulation is the limitation or restriction of legal consequences 
based on doubts about the genuineness of the relationship. This technique has 
been referred to as “moral gatekeeping”.238 However, when the decision is 
made within the discourse of status, the technique of manipulation is the 
analytical dismantling of constitutive status norms, for example, consent and 
coercion, and their application in what could be described a contextual 
vacuum, i.e. isolated from the context in which the norm typically operates. 
The analytical technique which enables these manoeuvres is dividing the 
issue at hand into preliminary and main issues. Characteristic for these cases 
is that any decision regarding the preliminary issue remains limited to that 
situation, the decision is binding on neither on the decision-maker in other 
cases or any other authorities.239 The recognition of a marriage, for example, 
will be assessed independently by each competent authority in each specific 
context.  
As demonstrated above, European migration laws include various 
mechanisms through which individuals are located in hierarchies of 
entitlement, for example based on the duration of the stay or the reason for 
the entry.240 These reflect the degree to which the individual is considered as 
belonging in society, as well as ideas constitutive of the concept of community, 
which underpins migration law. One such constitutive element is the notion of 
territory and territorial presence. Territoriality is based on the idea that the 
mere presence of an individual in the territory of a state raises rights that to 
some extent revoke the exclusiveness of citizenship.241 Ethical territoriality, 
which “treats membership as a matter of social fact rather than as legal 
formality”,242 is accepted in most legal systems, albeit to varying degrees. 
Constitutions, for example, often guarantee fundamental rights to “everyone” 
instead of only “citizens”.  
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Another constitutive element in the idea of community is that of the family. 
Belonging to a family mediates belonging to community – a state or a broader 
supranational community such as the EU.  However, both family and territory 
prescribe a border, which is not merely marginal to the concept but central to 
how these concepts operate in mediating exclusion and inclusion. Article IV 
examines how the construction of the family as a “fundamental group unit of 
society”, formed by spouses and their children, is paradigmatic in that  the 
exclusive understanding of relationships and belonging is both the 
justification of the legal rules that define the family and the result of those 
rules.  
Both Articles IV and V examine the recognition of family relationships in 
the context of migration law. In this context, what is at stake is the claim of the 
individual to a legal right to reside in a state together with his or her family 
members. As states are generally regarded as having a strong interest and 
sovereign right to control entry and residence of non-citizens, the question of 
recognition of the family relationship emerges as a preliminary question after 
which it still remains to be decided whether the relationship actually amounts 
to family life. In other words, in the context of migration the existence of family 
life is evaluated from the perspective of the right to respect for private and 
family life and the question of status emerges as a preliminary issue, which 
alone does not determine whether family life de facto exists between 
individuals. The technique of dividing the legal issue at hand to a preliminary 
issue and main issue enables the legal doctrine to manage the tension between 
competing doctrines.  
Article IV addresses the logic of recognition of family relationships in 
migration law by examining what can be called the “nuclear family paradigm”, 
i.e. the limits of the concept of family which defines which relationships 
constitute family as a prerequisite for the recognition of family life. The article 
notes that the concept of the family is constitutive of family life in that in some 
cases the decisions about which relationships of the individual family 
members define the borders of the family as a unit, while in other cases the 
quality of the relationship is decisive. The focus on the objectively defined 
status thus occurs alternately with a focus on the conduct of the family 
members, which offers an inquiry into the quality of the relationship: whether 
it amounts to genuine family life or effective family ties. 
The law may recognise the marriage formally but deny it any legal effect. 
Marriages of convenience are rejected as not amounting to family life and are 
thus refused the legal implications attached to ‘proper’ or ‘real’ marriages. 
When the immigration regime specifically carries out the work of boundary 
maintaining, it also undertakes several operations of “moral gatekeeping”, i.e. 
decides what should be considered eligible and morally worthy, what is the 
moral essence of, for example, a relationship.243 What makes a relationship 
“real” is connected to what kinds of relationships deserve protection. The 
moral quality of the relationship, then, is one factor in discretion about 
whether the relationship is genuine. These processes of the immigration 
regime thus interlink with other struggles prevailing in society, struggles for 
recognition of other types of families and other ways of life as well. A crucial 
poin to notice, however, is that as long as rights of entry are made dependent 
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on the existence of family life – implying that something in the quality of the 
relationship, rather than its form, is the subject of recognition – the process is 
necessarily inscribed with an evaluation of both the moral and material 
conditions that make a relationship genuine.  
 Immigration control has been argued to give preference to individuals 
whose marriages comply with majority values.244 For example, analysing the 
regulation of marriage migration by the British state in the period of 1962 to 
2010, Wray argued that British legal rules and practices created an informal 
and unarticulated hierarchy of acceptable marriages.245 Similarly to Wray, in 
their study on the Finnish court decisions on marriage migration Leinonen 
and Pellander noted that transnational relations as well as need for care could 
be interpreted as speaking against the genuineness of the marriage. According 
to the authors, the marital relationship was expected by the authorities to be 
the most central part of family life and applicants’ references to other ties to 
Finland, such as other family members or relatives living in Finland, could be 
interpreted as weakening the credibility of the marriage.246  
The tensions resulting from intersecting legal fields can also be 
manipulated within the discourse of status, as Article V demonstrates by 
means of close reading of a case from the Swedish Migration Court of Appeal. 
In this case a 16-year-old Iraqi woman, a mother of a one-year-old child, 
applied for a residence permit on the grounds that her father resided in 
Sweden. Her application was rejected as she was considered married, and thus 
not eligible for family reunification as an “unmarried minor child” and family 
member of her father’s family. While the applicant accepted that her marriage 
was valid according to Iraqi law, she argued, however, that the marriage 
should not be recognised in Sweden as it was in fact, both a forced marriage 
and child marriage. She had not consented to the marriage, which was 
concluded when she was only 15 years old. According to the applicant, 
recognising her marriage as valid would be against the fundamental values of 
Swedish society and the Swedish ordre public. The court applied the norms 
provided in the Act on Certain International Legal Relationships in respect of 
Marriage and Guardianship (Lag om vissa internationella rättsförhållanden 
rörande äktenskap och förmynderskap, 1904:26, hereafter IÄL), which govern 
the recognition of foreign marriages. It concluded that, for the purposes of 
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family reunification, the recognition of the marriage was not to be rejected on 
ordre public grounds.  
Had the registration of the applicant’s marriage appeared as a main issue, 
for example in the context of the registration of her personal information in 
the population register, the first observation we can make is that her own 
opinion on the matter would most likely have mattered; had she herself 
suggested that the marriage should not be recognised it probably would not 
have been registered. The marriage of the applicant most likely would not have 
been recognised had the issue emerged as the main issue, given that she herself 
would have opposed the recognition. 
Had the question of recognition of the marriage emerged as preliminary 
issue, for example, in the context of determining the paternity of her child, two 
goals would have been essential: on the one hand, the law seeks to promote 
the biological truth about the relationship between the man and the child, and 
on the other hand, to protect social ties between the child and the man. As 
securing the rights of the child are central in the paternity proceedings, the 
marriage could well be treated as recognisable in the sense of creating a pater 
est -assumption through which the husband would be considered the father of 
the child automatically. However, the recognition of the marriage depends on 
the circumstances of the case, i.e. whether it was likely that the husband was 
the biological father of the child and whether there were any social ties 
between him and child. 247 The research material collected for Article I shows 
that in some cases child marriages have not been recognised in the context of 
paternity proceedings and the husband has not been considered the father of 
the child.  
Furthermore, the norms of private international law can be used even 
against recognising minors’ marriages, as happened for example in 2015 in the 
European Court of Human Rights. In the case of R.H. and Z.H. v. Switzerland 
the Court referred to the doctrine of ordre public in refusing to recognise the 
marriage of two Afghan cousins, who had contracted a religious marriage in 
Iran at the ages of 14 and 18, as a legitimate union from which family life could 
arise.248  
The technique of analytically dividing the legal problem at hand into a 
preliminary issue and main issue thus serves to aid contextualisation, and the 
context is decisive as to how the issue of recognition is to be approached as 
well as to what precisely is the function that ordre public discretion is reckoned 
to serve. In the context of migration law, however, identifying the context of 
recognition is a puzzle. It matters a great deal whether we are making the 
decision about the recognition of the marriage in the light of the rules that, in 
the first place, require that family reunification has to be possible at least to 
                                                 
247 Writing about the problem of preliminary issues (i.e. incidental questions) in Swedish 
private international law, Jänterä-Jareborg argues in favour of a nuanced approach to the 
interests at stake regarding preliminary issues. This also points to the fact that private 
international law is increasingly conscious of the need to offer protection and respect the 
interests of the parties. Jänterä-Jareborg, Maarit. ‘The Incidental Question of Private 
International Law, Formalised Same-Sex Relationships and Muslim Marriages,’ in Patrik 
Lindskoug, Ulf Maunsbach and Göran Millqvist (eds.) Essays in Honour of Michael Bogdan, 
Lund: Juristförlaget, 2013, 149-164., 159.  




some extent, including those fundamental rights that require that states 
respect family life and rights of the child; or whether we perceive the context 
from the point of the the state’s right to control immigration, in which the 
limits of the rights granted are decisive, including the narrow interpretation of 
the concept of the family. In the first case, the context within which the issue 
of recognition should be assessed is the context of family-related human rights 
and relationality.249 Seeing these aspects as decisive would mean citing the 
recognition issue as part of the rights-oriented discussion on child marriages 
in Europe and emphasising the consequences of the recognition for the 
applicant herself – that recognising the marriage would mean that oppression 
against her was legitimised and, furthermore, would isolate her from life 
securing relations of the family, in which she could receive care and protection 
in her obviously vulnerable situation.  
In the second case, however, the decisive context would be that of 
immigration control as an area of policy government in which the starting 
point would be the sovereignty of the state and its broad powers to limit the 
entry of non-citizens in its territory and political community. The same binary 
pair of alternatives emerges regardless of whether the problem is located in 
the European human rights framework or in EU law. In EU law, the question 
would be which aspect is foundational, the essence of the right to family 
reunification provided by the Council Directive 2003/86/EC or the limits of 
the personal scope of the Directive deriving from the strict definition of the 
family provided in Article 4 of the Directive. 
The problem is hardly a new one. Hurri, for example, describes this 
problem of ordre public and the rule of law as the indeterminacy of the 
“foundations of the European individual”, which complicated the “movement 
of European individuals from the speciality of immigration law to the 
normality of public law”.250 Drawing on the early case law of the Community, 
he picks up on the constitutional relevance of the different uses of the ordre 
public doctrine, and the three different operations that can be carried out with 
it. In private international law, ordre public is a legal notion, which serves to 
secure that exemptions can be made in order to protect “elementary values 
enshrined in the foundations of the legal system, values that simply may not 
be compromised”.251 But ordre public may also be invoked as a governmental 
notion to justify necessary exemptions from legal rules, for example, limiting 
individual rights to secure other, more important rights or the general good. 
However, in immigration control, the field that migration law is most closely 
connected to, ordre public is not the exemption but the very foundation of the 
law. In this field, ordre public is the security regime maintaining the border 
and thus constitutive of all other operations within the law on migration. These 
dynamics stand out in the close reading of the cases included in this study. 
                                                 
249 For an account of relational subjectivity in human rights law, which does not 
necessarily follow preconceived structures of kinship, see Linda Hart, ’Relational Subjects: 
Family Relations, Law and Gender in the European Court of Human Rights’(Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Helsinki), 2016. Hart identified a historical shift from emphasising 
status such as marriage towards recognising identity such as sexual orientation in the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights. This shift, according to Hart, enables further 
recognition of relations and relational subjectivity. 
250 Hurri 2014, Birth of the European Individual, 139.  
251 Ibid., 138. 
Families and belonging: Intersectional inquiries 
64 
It was noted in Article V that the difficulty of characterising cases similar 
to MIG 2012:4 is that all of the legal fields involved – migration law, private 
international law, and human rights law – construct personhood and 
belonging differently, drawing the boundaries of inclusion and exclusion 
disparately. These constructions are related to the recognition relations 
perceived as foundational for the issue in question. The structure of 
preliminary issue and doctrines of ordre public enable perspectivism and 
flexible coupling of rules of private international law as part of the material 
question and context at hand. In this sense, the Savignian neutrality of private 
international law means neutrality towards the broad range of possible 
contexts in which the legal question at hand might be situated. Hence, this 
neutrality of the law is not neutrality of justice but rather, again to borrow the 
vocabulary used by Hurri, a quality of law which enables it to become 
submitted to the interests and policy goals of rival regimes of government.  
3.4 INTERSECTIONAL SUBJECTIVITIES: THE 
PARADOX OF LIBERAL RIGHTS AND THE 
PRODUCTION OF “ALIEN” FAMILIES 
So far the starting point is fairly simple. Migration law is based on 
distinguishable status groups, in which legal subjectivity is different for 
different individuals based on their status, to begin with whether they are 
insiders or outsiders and continuing to more subtle forms of distinctions. 
However, the legality of migration law frequently runs into conflict with the 
legality of modern legal relations writ large, i.e. legality based on equal rights, 
in which legal subjectivity is derived from the idea of universally recognisable 
personhood.252 In this section, the focus is on the techniques and realignments 
through which interlegality is produced in legal argumentation with reference 
to liberal rights, and how the very reference to rights serves to legitimize the 
status-based system, which initially was conceived as its opposite.  
I have argued above that for a large number of individuals and families, 
restrictions to the right to family reunification ar eset at a standard where this 
is the case even when a right to family reunification exists in theory. For 
example, in EU law the Family Reunification Directive provides the states with 
the right to set income requirements to sponsors so that family members 
entering the Member State are prevented from using social assistance. The 
standard of the income requirements, while it has to correspond to the level of 
‘social assistance’, is determined on the national level.253 In the case of 
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Chakroun (C-578/08), the Commission stated as its opinion that the 
determining factor is whether the person concerned himself has sufficient 
resources to meet his basic needs without recourse to social assistance; and 
the Directive should not be interpreted as allowing Member States to total up 
all the social benefits which the person concerned could claim in order to fix 
the threshold of required income on that basis.254  In my view, however, the 
matter remains open as to what actually are the limits of how high the standard 
of required income can be set, as long as the Member State can make the point 
that it is somehow related to the minimum standard of social assistance, and 
as long as everyone in the status category of ‘third country national’ are treated 
the same.255  
Furthermore, even though Member States may indicate a certain sum as a 
reference amount, the applications must be investigated on individual basis 
even when they do not meet that reference amount.256 CJEU has held that, 
since authorisation of family reunification is the general rule, the restrictions 
to this right must be interpreted strictly and the objectives and effectiveness of 
the directive must not be jeopardized.257 In addition, the Directive cannot be 
applied in such a manner that its application would disregard the fundamental 
rights set in the Charter. I argue, however, that the high income requirements 
and the structure of argument in which fundamental rights are presented as 
last resort, combined with a procedure that rests upon supreme instances’ 
requests for preliminary rulings of CJEU, in fact amount to making the right 
to family reunification an exception rather than the rule for large numbers of 
families.  
Placing the right of the state to restrict migration as the starting point of 
analysis of merits of an individual case – the “Strasbourg reversal” as Dembour 
calls it – means that the possibility of a non-citizen claiming a right of entry or 
stay is an exception based on circumstances and proportionality assessment 
rather than a right.258 Previous research has demonstrated that at this stage of 
discretion, when individual merits are evaluated in order to determine 
whether they are sufficiently exceptional, the balancing is heavily influenced 
by stereotypes and assumptions based on gender, ethnicity or culture.259  
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Article VI studies the right of the child to have its best interests considered 
in all decision-making and argues that when applied in the context of 
migration law, the best interests test becomes a paradox. The close reading of 
the case260 provided in Article VI examines how intersectionality can become 
part of the very power dynamics it seeks to redress. It is important to 
acknowledge that subjecting intersectional approaches to the disciplinary 
conventions of the field carries the risk of reifying existing forms of power and 
exclusion. Grabham uses the term disciplinary identity construction in order 
to address the disciplining aspects of intersectionality discourse, which risks 
becoming the “product of the regime in which it operates and which it was 
conceived to contest”.261 The analysis in Article VI shows that the rights of the 
child and the case-by-case approach of the best interests doctrine remain 
insufficient in safeguarding equal citizenship for children in the context of 
immigration law. Rather than a concept seeking to maximise the rights of the 
child, in the immigration context the norm of best interests becomes a tool for 
maximising the scope of legitimate interference with the family life of the child. 
The method of reading the case with an intersectional approach renders visible 
what discursively happens in the decision, i.e. that through the best interests 
evaluation the court constructs the identity of the child in ways that undermine 
the belonging of the child in Finnish society, even when the child was formally 
a Finnish citizen, born and raised in Finland. “Recognition” of identity and 
relational reality of the child was, in fact, merely a construction made by the 
court – and not an innocent one. By constructing the identity of the child the 
court specifically sought to to produce “aliennes” into the child and the family. 
During the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s most family laws were reformed in 
order to abolish legal norms that treated children differently on the basis of 
origin and family background, for example, based on whether they were born 
in or out of wedlock. Similarly, reforms in custody laws served to introduce 
new child-centred norms according to which the primary consideration in 
disputes over children was to be what was in the best interests of the child. 
This shift in recognition of citizenship of the child and the rights of the child 
could be regarded as one of the key emancipatory struggles for recognition in 
recent decades.  
The transformative idea behind the right of the child to have her best 
interests considered as a primary concern in all actions affecting children (also 
provided in Article 3 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of Child) is to 
ensure that the circumstances of the individual child are accorded due respect 
in decision-making. In Article VI, it was argued that that norm is capable of 
accommodating intersectionality, as it aims to make use of intersectional 
knowledge on case-by-case basis in order to change how law affects 
marginalised groups, in this case children. The idea is that the judges may 
balance the prevailing social injustice brought about by the vulnerability of 
children by using the best interests test, as far as is possible within the law. 
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However, this means that the legal context in which the assessment is 
conducted is decisive as to how the principle plays out.  
In principle, the guidelines concerning the best interests-evaluation apply 
equally to immigrant family reunification, and it was argued in Article VI that 
courts clearly fail to identify the relevant guidelines for the best interests-test 
and apply the principle incorrectly. More importantly, however, Article VI 
argued that the rights of the child in immigration control seem to amount to a 
paradox, even when applied ‘correctly’. According to Honneth, “a 
contradiction is paradoxical when, precisely through the attempt to realize 
such an intention, the probability of realizing it is decreased.”262 In the context 
of immigration control, the rights of the child end up signalling the legitimate 
scope of no rights rather than securing substantive rights. In the case, by 
evaluating the ties of the children to Finland and Algeria in a rather 
impressionistic manner the court was able to construct identities for the 
children as non-belonging (non-integrated) to Finland but with good chances 
of integrating to Algeria (belonging implied by their “culture”), despite the 
facts that they were born in Finland, had lived their whole lives in Finland and 
one of them was a Finnish citizen.263 
As was noted above, income requirements that seek to exclude migrant 
families from welfare distribution are generally considered legitimate, and 
these requirements are set remarkably high. As a result, the questions of 
children’s family rights are frequently invoked as the basis for claims 
exempting the family from the maintenance requirement. The structure 
according to which discretion in these cases proceeds thus approaches the best 
interests of the child as an exception to the main rule. It was noted in Article 
VI that the scope of the best interests assessment is often set quite narrowly so 
that the best interests of the child become relevant only in highly exceptional 
circumstances. For instance, according to the Finnish interpretation, only 
severe specific reasons, such as a life-threatening medical condition, may 
result in an exemption to the maintenance requirement. In migration cases, 
the best interests test serves a purpose of testing how badly a child of an alien 
may be treated. Article VI demonstrated how the best interests-evaluation 
emerged as underpinned by influential understandings of belonging and the 
identity of the children, thus effectively operating as a means of constructing 
the child’s identity as foreign and non-belonging in relation to Finnish society. 
Despite being formally included in the liberal realm of recognition relations, 
the child was cast outside as non-belonging, and this was done by using 
techniques of rights: the proportionality evaluation and the best interests-
evaluation.264  
Furthermore, the case raised the issue of recognition of family 
relationships in a reconstituted family. In the case at issue were the family 
rights of two children who had the same mother but different fathers. The only 
way to realize the rights of both children to both parents would have been to 
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permit everyone residence in Finland.265 However, by turning the recognition 
of the relationship into a matter of the direct relationship of dependency, 
divided into legal, financial and emotional forms of dependency, which were 
then to be evaluated analytically and individually for each member of the 
family in relation to another (one) member of the family, the Court was able 
to dismantle the relations of dependency in the family. It was not required to 
recognise the family relationships as bringing about multiple and 
simultaneous forms of dependency, which configurational approaches to 
families emphasise.266 Operating clearly within a discourse of relationship, the 
Court contested the truth of the relationship by dividing relationality into 
separate forms of dependency. This analytical dismantling the relationships 
within a family enabled it to strip the family of genuine familyhood and 
interdependence. 
The challenges relating to the recognition of children’s relationship rights 
under EU law are burning issues of the day and CJEU has recently delivered 
several important decisions related to the issue. While the decisions in cases 
CS (C-304/14)267 and Rendón Marín (C-165/14)268 concerned the effect of the 
criminal record of a third-country resident parent on his or her derived 
residence right, the new case of Chavez-Vilchez and others (C 133/15)269, is 
more relevant to the problem described above and in Article VI. The case 
concerned eight third-country resident parents who argued they were primary 
carers of their EU (Dutch) citizen children, and thus entitled to residence even 
though they had applied for social assistance.270 The eight applicants were 
each mothers of one or more Dutch citizen children. The fathers of these 
children were Dutch nationals and but the children lived mainly with their 
mothers. The Dutch government argued that they could not automatically be 
considered primary carers if the other parent could take care of the children.  
According to CJEU, the issue of direct dependency was of particular 
importance in deciding whether there was a derived right of residence. This 
time however, the court explicitly mentioned the best interests of the child. In 
reaching a conclusion as to whether there is such a relationship of dependency 
that the child would be compelled to leave the territory of the European Union 
if a right of residence were refused to that third-country national:  
 
account must be taken, in the best interests of the child 
concerned, of all the specific circumstances, including the age of 
the child, the child’s physical and emotional development, the 
extent of his emotional ties both to the Union citizen parent and 
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to the third-country national parent, and the risks which 
separation from the latter might entail for that child’s 
equilibrium.271 
 
However, the evaluation of the best interests of the child is to be 
undertaken by the competent authorities of the Member State, on the basis of 
the evidence provided by the third-country national, the necessary enquiries 
in order to be able to assess, in the light of all the specific circumstances, 
whether a refusal would have such consequences. It remains to be seen, how 
the best interests consideration will actually be undertaken by the authorities 
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4 CONCLUSIONS: RETHINKING 
RECOGNITION, BELONGING AND 
TRANSNATIONAL FAMILIES 
 
The first research question presented in this study concerned the legality of 
transnational family relationships. It was asked how transnational family 
relationships come to assume legal character; for what purposes legality is 
invoked and what meanings it bears. Taken as a whole, the study demonstrated 
the complex nature of legality. In general, at all sites of the study, legality was 
constructed through a practical discourse and in relation to a specific goal (or 
many goals). Legality was thus constructed in a process of interaction and 
meaning-making and, consequently, drew on multiple sources. 
At the first site of the study, in the interviews with individuals and religious 
actors we learned that legalities of state law and religious law were intertwined 
in productive ways in the case of Muslim marriage practices in Finland. Both 
religious actors and individuals expressed ideas about marriage as a status and 
as a relationship, and both of these registers, that of status and that of 
relationship, were drawn upon in constructing legality. The tendency of the 
religious actors to prioritise registered and officially recognisable marriages 
indicates that religious and state legalities are connected to form a unitary 
concept of legal status and to avoid fragmentation within this discourse of 
legitimate status. However, the interlocutors recognised the needs arising from 
everyday life and individuals’ various positionalities and relational realities, 
and mostly they accepted that religious-only marriages could be concluded for 
the purposes of entering religiously legitimate relationships that for whatever 
reason could not be registered.  
The multiple sources of legality and the ways they can be used with 
reference to either marriage as a status or marriage as an acceptable 
relationship seems to provide for two things. Firstly, it allows for religious 
authority to draw on state authority and vice versa. This way the power and 
authority embedded in the idea of legality becomes productive and mutually 
constitutive. Secondly, the multiple sources of legality allow for creative 
discontinuities between legalities. For example, the unitariness of legality in 
the discourse of status leaves room to negotiate the legality of the relationship 
as religious acceptability. If these two spheres of legality, that of state and that 
of religion, were completely disconnected, they would both be weaker in terms 
of authority and have less control over how people arrange their family lives.  
The diversity within the discourses of legality was also visible on the state 
institutional side. Hence, it is not merely something that exists within or 
results from the legal reality and mundane practices, in which legal norms are 
interpreted and enforced in everyday life in less than perfect ways. Complexity, 
rather, is a defining feature of ‘legality’ even in the normative discourses of 
state law itself. In the case of Muslim marriage practices in Finland it was noted 
that the intersectional positionality of individuals show in the ways in which 
some Muslim marriages become a focus of legal control. They receive legal 
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attention and become problematised not directly as religious marriages but as 
a result of the complexity of marriage regulation and its relation to registration 
and borders maintaining functions of the registry. Our examination of the 
paternity cases in Article I, in particular, indicated that paternity proceedings 
are a site where the discourses of civil and religious marriages become 
connected through the question of legitimate and recognisable descent. While 
the liberalisation and individualisation of family law has meant a detachment 
of the legal position of the child from the status of its parents’ relationship, the 
marital status of the parents still serves to categorise relationships, to 
legitimise and officiate them and to direct the official gaze towards suspect 
forms of relationships.  
At the second site of the study, that of CEDAW and the discourse of 
women’s rights in relation to culture, traditions and religion, legality emerged 
as a question of what the norm of equality should be understood to entail for it 
to be both universal in its normative dimension and culturally meaningful and 
connected to lived realities of individual women with diverse identities. 
Discourses within the framework of CEDAW seemed to be underpinned by 
secular-normative thinking, according to which culture and religion, generally 
speaking, can only be obstacles to equality. However, the concept of equality 
underlying CEDAW, namely the concept of substantive equality, renders 
equality as a legal principle compatible with diverse identities and lived 
experiences. It is a concept that can be used as a ‘sensibility’ for tracing not 
only pre-existing categories of discrimination and disadvantage but also 
intersectional experiences that might otherwise be invisible. Hence, while the 
concept of equality can be used to discipline, a successful use of the concept 
offers means to resist discrimination in both registers, that of status and that 
of relationship. 
At the third and fourth sites of the study, those of legislation and the 
“court”, the legality of transnational family relationships also drew on several 
resources. Here too legality was not simply a matter of pre-existing norms but 
was constructed in a process of subject-production. Central resources in this 
process were the discourses of status and relationship and the status categories 
of citizen and non-citizen. By establishing foundational restrictions of legal 
subjectivity through the category of the non-citizen, the illusion of legal 
equality as the foundation of legality could be maintained. At the same time, 
moving between discourses that derive legality either from the register of 
status or from the register of relationship enabled the court to creatively use 
legality as a resource of subject-production. In the analysis, different 
techniques for managing the legality of relationships were identified.  
On the one hand, when the decision was made within the discourse of 
relationship, the technique seemed to be the limitation or restriction of legal 
consequences based on doubts about the genuineness of the relationship. This 
technique has been referred to as “moral gatekeeping”.272 On the other hand, 
when the decision is made within the discourse of status, the technique seemed 
to be that of an analytical dismantling of constitutive status norms, such as 
consent and coercion. The technique, through which such dismantling is made 
possible, is the structural technique of dividing the issue at hand into a 
preliminary issue and a main issue. This technique of dismantling and 
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analytically dividing the case into smaller (isolated) units of analysis is, of 
course, a common technique in legal thinking. However, when it is analysed 
as part of the process in which legality is produced, it becomes evident that it 
has potential to obscure relations between the units of analysis and the ways 
in which these units may be mutually constitutive. The detrimental effect of 
this kind of “objective” analysis becomes particularly clear when the 
genuineness of the relationship is examined by dividing relationality into 
analytically distinct forms and isolated units of dependency.  
These observations of the research material were made possible by the 
theoretical approach adopted. This approach combined the theoretical 
framework of legal consciousness studies and the analytic of struggle as 
developed by Hurri. In legal consciousness studies, legality is understood as 
process based, socially constructed and therefore subject to change. In this 
framework, the discrepancies of law are not a weakness but a resource. 
Similarly for Hurri, the discontinuities in law are an interpretative resource 
through which law can both maintain its transcendence and stay firmly 
grounded in society. The case analyses in this study applied the analytic of 
struggle, which seeks to render visible the focal points in legal argumentation 
in which the choices between different techniques for managing conflicts are 
made.  
The second research question of this study concerned belonging and how 
the ways in which it is understood emerge in legal discourses about regulation 
and recognition of transnational family relationships. How do these discourses 
produce ideas of belonging and non-belonging, and thus create or reproduce 
social positionality and axes of inclusion and exclusion, especially at the 
intersections of different legal fields? It was noted above how the discourses of 
status and relationship facilitated a creative use of legality as a resource of 
subject-production. It was observed that courts may use various techniques to 
construct legality in ways that suit the goals of the particular discourse. In this 
process, belonging becomes constructed as an identity in relation to the 
dominant form of subjectivity in the discourse. 
Belonging is, essentially, about whether one is included in society and 
within its ethical recognition relations. Taken as a whole, this study 
demonstrates that recognition theory offers an adequate theoretical 
framework for reflecting on and conceptualising the complex issues of 
inclusion and membership. In the analyses of this study, belonging was 
reflected in the foundations of the legal fields and recognition relations 
underpinning them. In the cases under consideration however, belonging 
became articulated as an identity constructed discursively. This identity 
construction was an essential part of the way in which pre-existing 
subjectivities, i.e. “disciplinary identity constructions”,273 produce belonging 
and axes of exclusion. This highlights the fact that even intersectionally 
sensitive academic and disciplinary conventions and tools should be examined 
critically, as these are part of the processes of knowledge production that 
institutionalise and reify existing hierarchies.  
Citizenship, even in its legal dimensions is a dynamic form of social capital, 
capable of accumulation or diminution. It is determined by a plethora of 
identity factors marking the belonging of a person both in the family and 
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within the jurisdiction of a nation state. When belonging and identity of a 
person are constructed in legal practice in relation to the investigation of 
suspected “alienness”, markers of ‘otherness’, such as non-typical family ties, 
language or ethnic origin, play an important role. These identity narratives are 
brought to bear on the legal reasoning as facts to be taken into account in those 
phases of the decision-making that require discretion and balancing by the 
merits of the particular case.  
Given its orientation to the future, the third and final research question is 
arguably the most challenging: what new avenues might a recognition 
theoretical framework open for understanding the role of law in the struggles 
for social justice, especially through the logic of distinctions made in legal 
practice concerning belonging? Furthermore, this question set the challenge 
for rethinking law and the possibilities for its immanent critique in relation to 
social inclusion and exclusion. 
At the first site of the study, that of Muslim marriages in Finland, 
recognition has to do with the ability to understand the ways in which religious 
and secular meanings of marriage are intertwined, as well as the ways in which 
transnationalism creates intersectional positionalities for differently situated 
individuals and families. The policy implications of this include, for example, 
the need to assess marriage regulation as a whole with a view to its 
intersectional implications, as well as the need to rethink issues related to 
representation. The latter aspect points towards a critical reflection as to 
whether the concepts of ‘common good’ and ‘wellbeing’ underpinning the 
regulation of marriage and families in general actually are inclusive and 
sensitive to the experiences of transnational families. This issue of 
representation was also central to an adequate understanding of recognition at 
the second site of the study, that of human rights discourse on gender equality 
and religion. These findings confirm what previous studies have suggested; 
any top-down account of equality without empirical research into local 
practices, structures such as the safety nets of the welfare state, everyday life 
and diversity of lived experiences, is likely to produce and reify stereotypes as 
well as institutionalise patterns of misrepresentation. 
At the third and fourth sites of the study, which deal with migration law and 
its intersections of private international law and family law, the issue of 
recognition emerges as the question of ‘border’ and ‘who’ of community. While 
it is not possible to provide any definitive solutions to these issues, taken as a 
whole the study offers some thoughts as to how we might begin rethinking 
recognition in this respect. Fristly, some indications can be found in the way 
that the two senses of recognition were distinguished and linked in section 2.1. 
While formal logical coherence of legal norms throughout the legal system 
remains a fantasy – albeit, as we have seen, a practical and necessary one – 
coherence in the sense of principles and core values can at times be found by 
means of analytical conceptual analysis. However, this is possible only in 
classic situations of legal pluralism, on the understanding that the analysis is 
sufficiently informed by empirical research.  
 In cases of regime clash, the illusion of coherence is likely to be produced 
by means of “weak normative compatibility”,274 which in neoliberal processes 
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of subjectification set the conditions for intersubjective recognition. In these 
processes, rather than consistently reinforcing some given hegemony of power 
relations, subjectivities are produced by granting rights to some while 
withdrawing and reducing collective responsibility for all. Honneth argues that 
the “‘new’, ‘disorganized’, shareholder value-oriented capitalism affects in one 
way or another the normatively structured spheres” of recognition, “bringing 
about developments that lead to the reversal of these institutionalized 
normative achievements, decreasing solidarity and independence.”275 It is, 
however, within these normative achievements that elements of immanent 
critique can be identified.  
Of the three legal fields addressed by this study, the question of due 
recognition is by far the most difficult to answer in the field of migration law. 
Belonging is not only about being included in a community, but about being 
included in a community defined by solidarity. In this sense, being cast outside 
the sphere of ethical relations of society is to be cast outside the “community 
of responsibility”.276 In modern legal systems, social rights crystallise the 
notion that civil and political participation necessitate a certain standard of 
living and that inequalities are connected to different starting conditions, 
which are not under the individuals’ control. When these rights are eroded, 
responsibility becomes assigned to individuals even on issues that they are not, 
indeed cannot, be responsible for.277 The discourse of individual responsibility 
renders invisible the structures that enable or hinder subjects from accessing 
conditions required before they can really be treated as responsible for their 
choices and decisions.  
This assignment of individual responsibility is evident in several 
established doctrines and practices in migration law. As was noted above, 
those considered to be less belonging have less or no access to the welfare 
distribution and they are required to carry the financial burden 
independently.278 As several authors have noted, many migrants simply do not 
have such resources that would really enable strategic action on a large 
scale.279 But not only are they required to bear the costs privately, but also their 
other circumstances are framed as private choices. These “choices” include the 
“choice” concerning whether their “family life was created at a time when the 
persons involved were aware that the immigration status of one of them was 
such that the persistence of that family life within the host State would from 
the outset be precarious”;280 or which country they “chose” reside in;281 or 
whether they chose to stabilise their position as “settled migrants” by 
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honouring immigration rules and not becoming irregular migrants.282 In 
addition, children can be identified with the conduct of their parents, as 
otherwise there would be a risk that parents exploited the situation of their 
children in order to secure a residence permit for themselves (and for the 
children).283 
Previous literature, as well as the analyses provided in this study, 
demonstrate that the ways in which migrant families are actively produced as 
non-belonging aliens is an urgent case of expulsion from rights, and severs the 
legitimacy of the legal relations in society. Simply put, it is ethically 
unbearable. But can law, through means of immanent critique, come up with 
more just solutions? 
 It seems to me that the persistent framing of the issues concerning social 
inclusion of transnational families as one of opposition between the rights of 
the sovereign state and those of the individual will get us nowhere. Perhaps 
the real problem is more fundamental than the idea of sovereignty would have 
us believe. To return to the idea presented in the beginning of this thesis, i.e. 
the observation that the common response to the social issues invoked by 
borders and migration is to debate over the principles according to which 
access to mobility should be distributed, it seems that the paradigm of 
distribution simply fails to address the real issues.284 
In response to this prevailing problem, political and legal theory have 
suggested transnationally oriented definitions of society and state 
responsibility,285 as well as an open borders philosophy.286 Recognition theory, 
in breaking away from the decisive function of distribution towards the 
theories of justice, might offer support for rethinking communities, 
subjectivities and solidarity in transnational terms. The concept of a 
democratic state as a sovereign deciding on the borders of its population – and 
the concept of justice linked to this idea - is problematic not only in relation to 
individual rights, which always require balancing with collective interests. In 
Honneth’s terms, it is also problematic because the principles of justice cannot 
be created autonomously since the material of justice – due recognition – is 
not a disposable good.287 
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